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Prologue
Informational asymmetries are considered to be the major cause of inefficien-
cies in commercial banking. Contemporary research in the field of financial
intermediation identifies relationship banking to be elementary for reducing
these inefficiencies (for a comprehensive survey see Boot, 2000; Elyasiani and
Goldberg, 2004). The key tool of relationship banking to mitigate informational
asymmetries is to produce private information about a customer while in a
banking relationship with that customer. Concepts of relationship banking
differ, first, in the way information is produced and, second, in the way this
information is utilized by the bank.
When engaging in relationship lending, the most studied and most regarded field
in relationship banking,1 banks can utilize private information to improve the
lending business. With more and better information about a borrower, banks
should be able to make a more sophisticated assessment of creditworthiness
and borrower quality. This can reduce problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard, which should lead to higher credit availability, more quality-adequate
credit rates, or decreased requirements of costly collateral. The extensive
empirical literature studying the effects of relationship lending on market
outcomes finds that relationship lending increases the availability of funds
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Cole, 1998), especially for borrowers of small
banks (Cole et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2005), and leads to decreased collateral
requirements (Berger and Udell, 1995; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). The
results concerning the effect on credit rates are more ambiguous. While some
studies find that relationship lending lowers credit rates (Berger and Udell,
1995; Bharath et al., 2011), others find increasing credit rates with the duration
of the relationship (Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000) or no significant effects
1Relationship banking and relationship lending are often used interchangeably in the literature.
However, there are, of course, also non-lending banking products and services that can profit
from private information about customers.
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of relationship lending on the price of credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Elsas
and Krahnen, 1998).
The mixed empirical evidence for the effect of relationship lending on credit
rates is explained by theoretical research. Boot and Thakor (1994) predict
decreasing credit rates with the length of a bank-firm relationship. They argue
that banks dynamically optimize borrowers’ incentives by taxing borrowers in
the early stage of a long-term relationship with above-cost credit rates and
subsidizing borrowers with decreasing credit rates as the relationship matures.
Greenbaum et al. (1989), Sharpe (1990), and Petersen and Rajan (1995),
however, show that hold-up problems can arise due to relationship lending
that lead to increasing credit rates. They argue that relationships provide
inside lenders with an informational advantage over outside lenders. Due to
information asymmetries between outside lenders and relationship borrowers,
the latter may be informationally captured by inside lenders. That allows inside
lenders to exploit their informational advantage to charge higher credit rates.
Another possible shortcoming of relationship lending is the soft budget con-
straint problem (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996).
To increase the probability of recovering the previous loan, inside lenders may
extend credit to distressed borrowers who cannot get funds by outside lenders.
If borrowers, however, anticipate this possibility to renegotiate their contracts
ex post, bad incentives can arise ex ante. Besides these results, the possibility
to renegotiate a credit contract can also be an efficiency-enhancing flexibility of
relationship lending in complex real-world environments where contracts cannot
capture every possible state of the world. In this way, relationship lenders can
provide liquidity insurance in situations of unexpected temporary deterioration
of borrowers liquidity (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998).
To subsume, private information about borrowers are apparently known to be
uttermost important for the lending business. Producing such information to
reduce problems that arise because of informational asymmetries constitutes a
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raison d’être of banks. Nonetheless, the most recent financial crisis of 2007/2008
was catalyzed by lax lending standards that increasingly ignored borrower
quality. Lending was conveniently rather based on collateral in times of steady
rising house prices and nearly boundless possibilities of credit securitization.2
That was especially the case for household lending. As a result, aggregate
household debt, default rates of household loans, and sizes of defaults have
significantly increased over the past years (Athreya et al., 2012). Hence, the
question arises how relationship lending to private households can contribute
to counter these effects and the depicted experience of the financial crisis.
Most of the relationship lending literature concerns firm lending and the results
cannot always be transferred to household lending without restrictions. The
most direct way to produce credit-relevant private information about a borrower
is to engage in repeated lending. While this approach seems to work very well
for firm lending, it often promises very limited learning potential when it comes
to household lending. Households usually do not at all engage in substantial
lending as frequently and numerously as firms. Hence, households may never
possess extensive credit track records, especially for high volume loans like in
mortgage lending, and numerous loan demanding households actually do not
possess credit records at all. For relationship lending to households, banks are
often limited to learn about borrowers by interacting with them in different
products. I argue that repeated interactions in saving relationships exceedingly
qualify for the purpose of identifying borrower qualities, foremost because
saving substantially requires the same individual characteristic as repaying a
loan: the ability to regularly abstain from consumption. This view is confirmed
by recent empirical evidence: Puri et al. (2017) show that saving relationships
prior to lending can provide information that help to reduce loan defaults of
households. Theoretical research is yet missing.
The contribution of the first part of my thesis is to provide theoretical research
2The lax lending practice was, of course, also caused by other factors, e.g. by loose monetary
policy and regulation failure.
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on relationship lending that is based on information production about borrowers
in preceding saving relationships. To analyze the efficiency of savings-linked
relationship lending, I develop a multi-period partial equilibrium model of
lending to private households and compare savings-linked relationship lending
with arm’s-length lending. I derive competitive contract designs and derive
market characteristics for which savings-linked relationship lending can be an
equilibrium choice and enhance the efficiency of the financing market.
One important result of my model is that savings-linked relationship lending
is particularly well suited and economically beneficial for housing finance of
private households. Further, the competitive contract design of savings-linked
relationship lending that I derive in the model shares major characteristics
with Bauspar contracts. The concept of Bausparen (in English: contractual
saving for housing) can therefore be seen as an implementation of savings-linked
relationship lending. Bausparen features a contractual saving stage before the
loan is made and on which lending is based, but it also contains several other
specifics. These include contract-inherent options regarding the loan granting
and the loan repayment, and a contractually fixed interest rate for the saving
stage as well as a fixed credit rate for the future loan.
Despite being a widespread and important product of housing finance in Europe
and existing since about a century, research about Bausparen is utterly scarce
and the available economic explanations are insufficient. Existing research
mainly concentrates on explaining the value of Bausparen in terms of the
hedging effects that it provides towards future interest rate changes. But this
cannot explain the specific savings-linked design of Bausparen since this is
not required for effective hedging. My model is capable of filling this gap and
provides, to my knowledge, the first rigorous theoretical relationship lending
explanation for Bausparen and highlights its savings-linkage.
The hitherto discussion establishes the result that producing and possessing
proprietary information about borrowers is valuable for lenders. Prima facie, it
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therefore seems contradictory that lenders in most countries engage in sharing at
least some of their proprietary information with competitors by using publicly
regulated or private credit registries (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Djankov et al.,
2007). Theoretical research provides several explanations for credit information
sharing. One of them is that information sharing can discipline borrowers
and reduce moral hazard (Vercammen, 1995; Padilla and Pagano, 2000). This
result is based on reputation effects. If borrowers fail to repay their loan with
one lender, information sharing between lenders provides this information to
every other lender who incorporate it in their assessment of borrower quality.
Borrowers may therefore lose their reputation with every lender when failing
with one lender, which can induce incentives to perform. The problem is,
however, that reputation effects diminish if there is less to learn about agents.
That means, the more comprehensive the credit registry becomes, the weaker
the reputation effects of information sharing get. To prevent the reputation
effects of credit information sharing from diminishing and finally disappearing,
the previous literature suggests to restrict credit reporting. This, however,
seems hard to realize and comes at the expense of efficiency-enhancing effects
that information sharing can produce on other levels (Pagano and Jappelli,
1993; Padilla and Pagano, 1997; Bouckaert and Degryse, 2006).
The contribution of the second part of my thesis is to show that credit informa-
tion sharing can induce borrower discipline beyond “passive” reputation effects
if the information shared is actively used. I provide a new approach to discipline
borrowers on the basis of credit information sharing. This approach is adapted
from classical disciplining which is the principle that undesired outcomes need
to inevitably provoke unfavorable consequences. In a multi-period model of
repeated lending in a market with established credit information sharing, I
analyze and compare two different ways of disciplining. First, disciplining by pro
rata credit rationing, where lenders punish defaulting borrowers by decreasing
next period’s credit volumes. Second, disciplining by credit rate tightening,
where lenders punish defaulting borrowers by increasing next period’s credit
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rates. I can show that disciplining is not sensitive to increasing informativeness
of credit registries and therefore also possible in case of an informationally
comprehensive credit reporting. That means that disciplining can even work
when reputation effects break down. This is especially true when defaulters are
punished with lower credit volumes, which constitutes a rare case of efficient
equilibrium credit rationing that is not a case for government intervention.3
The remainder of my thesis is organized as follows. Part I analyzes the effi-
ciency of savings-linked relationship lending. Part II revisits the effect of credit
information sharing on borrower discipline. Concluding remarks are given in
the epilogue.
3This complements a substantial literature about inefficient credit rationing (Jaffee and
Russell, 1976; Keeton, 1979; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, 1983; Williamson, 1986). An exception
is de Mesa and Webb (1992).
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Part I
The Efficiency of Savings-linked
Relationship Lending
Abstract
In a multi-period partial equilibrium model of lending to private house-
holds, I compare arm’s-length lending with relationship lending that is
based on information production about borrowers in preceding saving
relationships. These are often the only source of private information that
lenders possess about loan demanding households. The model shows that
savings-linked relationship lending leads to a Pareto improvement or
an increasing allocative efficiency of the financing market compared to
arm’s-length lending in markets of low time preference or low average
borrower quality. In these markets, savings-linked relationship lending
can overcome financing market failure due to adverse selection, especially
for financing volumes that are large in comparison to households’ pe-
riodic savings or incomes. Thus, the model shows that savings-linked
relationship lending is particularly well suited and economically bene-
ficial for housing finance of private households and is able to increase
home ownership rates. Competitive savings-linked relationship lending,
as derived in the model, shares major characteristics with contractual
saving for housing which is a widespread and important product of
housing finance in Continental Europe. My model therefore provides, to
my knowledge, the first theoretical relationship lending explanation for
contractual saving for housing. Further, my results add a novel economic
explanation for synergies between the two main activities of traditional
commercial banking, deposit-taking and lending.
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1 Introduction
In relationship lending, lenders utilize private information that they have pro-
duced in a relationship with a client to improve the lending business with the
same client. Information is generally produced over time by repeated interaction
with a client either in the same product or in a different product. Adding the
temporal dimension, approaches of relationship lending can be divided into
information production by (a) sequential interaction in the same product, (b)
sequential interaction in different products, or (c) simultaneous interaction
in different products. The information that is produced by a creditor while
simultaneously interacting with the debtor in different products is useful for
credit monitoring. Mester et al. (2007), for instance, show empirically that
transaction accounts help financial intermediaries to monitor commercial bor-
rowers. The approach to learn from sequential interaction in the same product
has been examined theoretically essentially for the case of firm lending (Pe-
tersen and Rajan, 1995; Sharpe, 1990; von Thadden, 2004), where lenders learn
about the quality of a firm from its debt service behavior in preceding lending
relationships and utilize the information they have gathered for upcoming
lending relationships with the same firm. This kind of learning from preceding
credit relationships for subsequent credit relationships with the same debtor is
conceptually also conceivable for lending to private households. But, as already
outlined in the prologue, households do usually not at all engage in substantial
lending as frequently and numerously as firms. Hence, households may never
possess extensive credit track records, especially for high volume loans like
in mortgage lending, and numerous loan demanding households actually do
not possess a credit record at all. This radically restricts the possible extent
of learning from repeated lending. Consequently, information production that
is required for relationship lending to private individuals is often limited to
sequential interaction in different products.4
4An advantage of this approach over the others is that some adverse selection problems of
lending can only be mitigated if private information is produced prior to loan granting,
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I argue that repeated interactions in saving relationships exceedingly qualify
for the purpose of identifying individual borrower qualities for two reasons.
First, saving track records are quite easy to build and, second, saving behavior
is a highly relevant proxy for individual borrower quality. The latter is true
because saving substantially requires the same basic individual characteristic
as debt service: the ability to regularly abstain from consumption. This view
is supported by recent research of Puri et al. (2017). They present empirical
evidence that saving relationships prior to lending can provide information that
help to reduce loan defaults of households.
The approach to use saving relationships to improve the lending business
further contributes to the literature on the economics of traditional commercial
banking. In this context my work provides a novel theoretical relationship
lending explanation for economic synergies between the main activities of
traditional commercial banking, namely deposit-taking and lending (Kashyap
et al., 2002).
I develop a multi-period partial equilibrium model of unsecured5 lending to
private households in order to study relationship lending that is based on
information production in prior saving relationships with private individuals.
I compare such savings-linked relationship lending with arm’s-length lending
and autarkic savings accumulation in a competitive financing market with
individuals that differ in their ability to abstain from consumption, that is, in
borrower quality.
Different from existing approaches in the relationship lending literature, I
consider that relationship lending is not just a free byproduct of customer
relationships. Information production in relationships is costly as it at least
requires time. Savings-linked relationship lending is therefore only applicable
with temporal delay compared to arm’s-length lending. This imposes costs on
which necessarily requires learning from different products.
5This assumption is to set the focus on private information about borrowers which are more
relevant if credit is less secured. For research about the effects of collateral see Coco (2000).
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savings-linked relationship lending in a market with individuals that feature
positive time preference.
I show that savings-linked relationship lending is an equilibrium choice in
markets of low time preference or in markets of low average borrower quality. In
these markets, savings-linked relationship lending leads to a Pareto improvement
or an increasing allocative efficiency of the financing market compared to arm’s-
length lending. It is further shown that savings-linked relationship lending
can overcome financing market failure that is due to adverse selection and
enable financing when arm’s-length lending is not viable in equilibrium. This is
especially true for financing volumes that are large in comparison to households’
periodic savings or incomes since savings-linked relationship lending shows, in
contrast to arm’s-length lending, to be robust to ceteris paribus changes in
financing volume. Hence, savings-linked relationship lending is particularly well
suited and economically beneficial for housing finance of private households
and is able to increase home ownership rates.
The model has a direct application to contractual saving for housing (CSH)6, a
widespread, important, and longtime successful product of housing finance in
Continental Europe, especially in Germany, Austria, France, and the Czech Re-
public. CSH can also be found in Belgium, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and has also been considered to be implemented in
further European countries, e.g. the Netherlands and Belarus. Inspired by the
extensive and successful use of CSH in Europe, China and India experiment
with contractual saving for housing since 2003 and 2004. In Germany CSH
substantially exists since the 1920s and about 36 percent of the population
owned a CSH contract in the year 2015; in Austria and the Czech Republic the
market penetration in 2015 reached about 59 and 40 percent, respectively, and
was even greater in the past.7 In its simplest form, the actual design of CSH
contracts is akin to the competitive contract design of savings-linked relation-
6In Germany and Austria the traditional term Bausparen is used.
7Data sources: Verband der Privaten Bausparkassen, OeNB, EFBS, eurostat.
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ship lending derived in the model: in a contractual saving stage, savings are
regularly transferred to the contract-providing bank over a particular time span
before a loan is made contingent on the saving behavior. Since savings-linked
relationship lending can be identified to be a central element of CSH, CSH
shares the economic efficiency that my model indentifies for savings-linked
relationship lending. My work is to my best knowledge the first to give a pure
relationship lending explanation for CSH and to explain the economic benefits
of its savings-linked design. Previous attempts to economically explain CSH
in the very thin literature mainly focus on arguments of interest rate hedging
since the credit rate of the future contingent loan is fixed in the contract terms
of CSH (Cieleback, 2002; Plaut and Plaut, 2004).8 These works, however, fail
to explain the specific savings-linked design of CSH since this is not required
for effective hedging.
Lea and Renaud (1995) recognize the feature of CSH to learn from individuals’
saving behavior about their borrower qualities, but they verbally conclude that
CSH is merely adequate for transition economies. This is in sharp contrast with
the prevalence of CSH in some highly developed economies in Central Europe.
My results, however, disclose that contractual saving for housing can indeed
be beneficial in transition economies to overcome substantial informational
asymmetries. But CSH can also be beneficial in developed economies if time
preference is sufficiently low, that is, if individuals regard the quality of housing
to be more important than the time of its possession.
The remainder of Part I is organized as follows. I develop the basic theoretical
model in Section 2. I solve it for the benchmark case of perfect information,
then derive the asymmetric information equilibrium, first, for a market with
arm’s-length lending and, second, for a market that additionally features savings-
linked relationship lending. Subsequently, parametric results are presented and
discussed, and the economic efficiency of savings-linked relationship lending
8Zietemann (1987) and Scholten (1999) evaluate CSH from a capital budgeting perspective,
which is, however, not capable of explaining an inherent economic value of CSH.
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is derived. Section 3 introduces modifications to the basic model. Section 4
first applies the model to housing finance and to contractual saving for housing
and then discusses the effects of state subsidy for savings-linked relationship
lending. I close with a conclusion in Section 5.
2 The Model
I develop a T -period model of risk-neutral9 and utility maximizing private
individuals who desire to consume a particular good G. Individuals have no
initial endowment but they can save a fraction of their income every period
for the purpose of acquiring G. There are two quality types of individuals.
High quality individuals, H, are able to save 1 monetary unit every period
with certainty. Low quality individuals, L, manage to save 1 monetary unit
with probability p and to save nothing with converse probability 1− p, where
e−1 ≤ p < 1. The main results of this work do not depend on the assumption
that the success probability has a lower bound of e−1 but this assumption makes
the mathematics much more convenient. A general version of the model for a
lower bound of zero and its proof is provided in Appendix C. The proportion
of type H individuals in the market is denoted by θ and 1− θ is the proportion
of low quality types, where 0 < θ < 1.
Let individuals live T ≥ 2 periods. As alternative interpretation of the model’s
total number of periods, T , regard it as the time span in which individuals are
able and willing to regularly assign savings to payments that are related to
good G. Good G is only acquired once in an individual’s life at time t and no
quality upgrades subsequent to the purchase are possible. Let us assume for
simplicity that individuals do not receive any utility from savings that are not
used for G.10 Individuals have a positive time preference and therefore prefer
9The assumption of risk-neutrality is appropriate to isolate my results from hedging argu-
ments.
10This assumption may seem stronger than it is since it basically just standardizes the utility
from an alternative consumption to zero.
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to consume G as soon as possible.11 To which extent they do so is reflected by
the exogenous per-period time preference factor δ, where 0 < δ < 1. While I
use t to refer to the time of purchasing good G, I use τ to generally refer to a
point in the time frame of the model.
As savings are individuals’ only source for debt service, individuals’ saving
behavior also directly determines their borrower quality. Banks can therefore
learn about an individual’s type by observing her saving behavior which can-
not be observed publicly but only by the particular inside bank that is in a
saving relationship with the individual. Let us abstract from preexisting saving
accounts. Individuals can choose to save by themselves in a money box or they
can save using a saving account of one and only one bank of their choice. I rule
out that the total amount saved can be used for signaling. That means that
individuals cannot credibly convey information about their quality by exposing
the amount saved to an outside bank.12
Individuals can choose autarky (marked by A) and accumulate savings until
time t ∈ (0, T ] to purchase G. But they can also apply for a loan on the
competitive financing market at time t ∈ [0, T ), where risk-neutral and profit
maximizing banks offer unsecured loans and zero-interest saving accounts to
individuals. Banks know the general utility function of the individuals, the
proportion θ, and the saving probabilities of the different types but they have
no initial information about the quality type of a particular individual.
Banks can offer two different types of credit to individuals: arm’s-length debt
and relationship loans. While arm’s-length lending is not based on information
production about individuals’ quality, relationship lending is. In my model,
banks can probabilistically learn about an individual’s quality by observing
11See Olson and Bailey (1981) for arguments in favor of a positive pure time preference.
12The justification of this assumption is, first, that banks cannot assess if the amount of
money that is presented to them actually consists of regular savings for G and not of
income that is finally not dedicated to be used for G. Second, banks may not find out about
that since the amount of equity used for purchasing G is not of interest in an unsecured
loan.
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her saving behavior in a saving relationship and use this information to offer
savings-linked relationship loans. Therefore, relationship lending is costly since
information production requires time.
Savings-linked relationship lending can generally be implemented in two different
ways. First, the link between loan terms and saving behavior can be merely an
implicit agreement that is not contractually fixed. Effects of reputation, e.g.,
need to prompt banks to take individuals’ saving behavior into account when
loan terms are offered. The second implementation, however, contractually
defines the loan terms contingent on the saving behavior in the preceding
saving relationship. Such a savings-linked contingent loan contract is entered
simultaneously with a saving relationship at time τ = 0. The contract specifies
the time t when the loan is made and predefines the contingent loan terms. Let
us assume that individuals can quit the saving relationship at any time and
opt for an alternative financing. Further, let us entirely abstract from costs and
frictions of contingent contracting.
Individuals receive utility from the quality13 of G they expect to be able to
afford at time t.14 The expected quality, Qt, of G that individuals of type
ω ∈ {H,L} can afford at time t is composed of the expected amount saved until
t and of the financing `t they can take out at time t, thus Qt = `t + E[S0,t(ω)].
Let us define Sτ1,τ2(ω) as the amount that individuals of type ω save between
time τ1 and time τ2, where τ1 < τ2. The expected total amount that a type H
individual can save between τ1 and τ2 is (τ2 − τ1)1, for a type L individual it is
E[Sτ1,τ2(L)] =
τ2−τ1∑
i=0
prob(i, τ2 − τ1) i = (τ2 − τ1)p, (1)
where, following from the binomial process of the savings, prob(i, n) is the
probability that a type L individual saves exactly the total amount i over the
13Depending on context, an interpretation as quantity is also possible.
14I presume a strong proportionality between price and quality of good G.
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next n periods,
prob(i, n) :=
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i. (2)
Since individuals desire more quality of G over less and obtain no utility
from savings that are not used for G, competition between banks leads to an
equilibrium loan contract with a repayment that consists of all the upcoming
savings until T and hence the highest possible loan volume.15 From this follows
that there is no need to model the loan rate explicitly, the loan volume is
sufficient. Thus, with the risk-free market interest rate standardized to zero,
individuals’ utility is generally described by
u(Qt, t) = Qtδ
t. (3)
The expected utility that an individual of type ω receives from a particular
financing option, φ, is denoted by Uφω . I write `
φ
t for the greatest feasible
financing volume in financing option φ that can be granted at time t. In the
peculiar case of autarky I maintain this notation and naturally obtain the
financing volume `At ≡ 0 at t.
Individuals always prefer more utility over less. The decision of individuals in
indifference situations follows the tiebreaker rule that is defined hereinafter.
Definition I.1 (Tiebreaker rule). Consider the individuals’ decision options
a = (Qa, ta) and b = (Qb, tb) that provide the expected utilities U(a) and U(b),
respectively. If U(a) = U(b), individuals first choose loans that are granted
immediately, that is, at t = 0 over loans with t > 0. Second, individuals choose
pooling contracts over separating contracts.16 If the indifference is still unsolved,
individuals choose a over b if ta < tb, then if Qa > Qb.
15This is possible if there are no costs of default, which I shall presume.
16This assumption can be considered a social disposition of individuals if no individual
disadvantages emerge.
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2.1 First Best Solution
In a world of perfect information every bank knows about the quality of every
particular individual. That allows banks to selectively offer contracts with
different loan terms to different quality types of individuals. Pooling contracts,
instead, offer by definition the same loan terms to different types of individuals
and therefore result in high quality individuals cross-subsidizing low quality
individuals. Thus, pooling contracts can clearly never be better for high quality
individuals than type-adequate loan terms. As type H individuals can and will
choose the utility maximizing contract (that features zero cross-subsidization)
in a competitive market environment, no pooling contracts are found in the
perfect information equilibrium and the selectively offered loan contracts feature
type-adequate loan terms.
A bank offers type-adequate standard loans (SL)—denoted by LSL for types L
and HSL for types H—to individuals if it can expect to at least break-even.
Banks do so if they offer loan volumes that do not exceed individuals’ expected
debt service potential which is the expected total savings of the future. Type
H individuals have a certain total debt service potential of St,T (H) = T − t at
time t and type L individuals have an expected total debt service potential of
E[St,T (L)] = (T − t)p at time t. Since utility maximizing individuals prefer the
maximum loan volume they can get at time t, banks’ break-even constraints
are binding in the competitive equilibrium and they offer `HSLt = T − t and
`LSLt = (T − t)p. This leads to the utilities UHSLH = Tδt and ULSLL = Tpδt, which
are obviously both maximized for t = 0.
Information production is, of course, irrelevant under perfect information. Thus,
saving relationships prior to a loan are meaningless as they cannot lead to more
accurate loan terms but impose costs of deferral of consumption.
If individuals choose autarky and do not to take out a loan at all, the quality
of G that individuals can afford at time t is equal to their accumulated savings
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until t. Thus, types H have an expected utility of UAH = tδt and types L
of UAL = ptδt in case of autarky. The optimal time of consumption is given
by t = tA := min[−1/ ln(δ), T ] for both types. The individuals’ utility from
autarkic consumption can therefore obviously never be better than from the
best type-adequate loan contract. Proposition I.1 summarizes.
Proposition I.1. In the first best equilibrium, individuals of type H (L) con-
sume good G of quality T (Tp) immediately, financed with type-adequate stan-
dard loans.
2.2 Arm’s-Length Lending
In presence of informational asymmetries and absence of information production,
banks cannot distinguish between different types of individuals. Therefore, type-
adequate loan terms are not possible and banks can only offer the same loan
contracts to all the individuals or to random individuals without knowing their
particular quality. If these loan contracts aim to attract all the individuals, we
have pooling contracts, while separating contracts intend to be solely accepted
by individuals of a particular type.
2.2.1 Pooling Arm’s-Length Loan Contracts
The total repayment of a standard loan contract that is granted at time t is
equal to min[Dt, St,T (ω)], where Dt is the contractual total repayment. When
offering a pooling arm’s-length loan (denoted by PAL) to random individuals
at time t, banks’ participation constraint is given by
`t ≤ θDt + (1− θ)
T−t∑
i=0
prob(i, T − t) min(i,Dt). (4)
The maximum utility is reached for the greatest feasible loan at time t which
can be offered for the maximum repayment Dt = T − t (since individuals
do by assumption not gain any utility from unused savings) and a binding
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participation constraint of banks. Equation (4) becomes
`t = `
PAL
t := θ(T − t) + (1− θ)(T − t)p. (5)
The expected utility that the different types of individuals receive from a PAL
that is made at time t follows to be
UPALH = (`
PAL
t + t)δ
t =
[
θ(T − t) + (1− θ)(T − t)p+ t]δt, (6)
UPALL = (`
PAL
t + tp)δ
t =
[
θ(T − t) + (1− θ)(T − t)p+ tp]δt. (7)
Since ∂UPALL /∂t < 0, types L prefer to take out a PAL at time t = 0. The utility
maximizing PAL for type L individuals is therefore given by `PAL0 = T (θ+p−θp).
For types H the optimal time t for consuming G with a pooling arm’s-length
loan can be stated with respect to the time preference measure,
arg max
t∈[0,T )
UPALH =

0 if δ ≤ δPAL:lo := exp
(
−(1−θ)(1−p)
T (θ+p−θp)
)
,
tPAL if δ ∈ (δPAL:lo, δPAL:hi) ,
t→ T if δ ≥ δPAL:hi := exp
(
−(1−θ)(1−p)
T
)
.
(8)
t = tPAL ∈ (0, T ) is a finite real-valued and unique maximum of UPALH if
δ ∈ (δPAL:lo, δPAL:hi), where
tPAL := T − T
[
(1− θ)(1− p)]−1 − ln(δ)−1. (9)
The preferences of the different types of individuals apparently differ regarding
pooling contracts. In a competitive financing market, the preferences of the
individuals generally determine which break-even loan contracts are offered.
For pooling contracts, the preferences of types H are crucial. If banks offer
loan contracts with pooling terms that are actually not chosen by types H,
they face losses if the intended pooling contracts are accepted by low quality
individuals. It follows that type L individuals cannot expect to receive the
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pooling contract of their choice since banks can only offer pooling terms if high
quality individuals (or no one) accept. Contracts that are only chosen by types
L, however, require LSL terms to let banks break even.
Banks can offhandedly offer standard loans with LSL terms. Further, individuals
can always opt for autarky. It can be seen from Eq. (8) that type H individuals
choose autarky over a pooling arm’s-length loan if δ ≥ δPAL:hi. But if δ < δPAL:hi,
types H prefer a PAL over autarky since UH(`PALt ) − UH(`At ) = (T − t)
[
θ +
(1 − θ)p]δt > 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ). A pooling arm’s-length loan also always offers
greater utility than a loan with LSL terms to high quality individuals since
UH(`
PAL
t )− UH(`LSLt ) = (T − t)θ(1− p)δt > 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ).
The maximum utility that type L individuals receive from an LSL or from
autarky can be regarded as their lower limit of utility, denoted by U¯L. As the
financing options LSL and autarky are not affected by informational asym-
metries, the previous first-best analysis is still valid and from Proposition I.1
follows that U¯L = UL(`LSL0 ). Low quality individuals only accept a pooling
arm’s-length loan contract if it provides greater utility than their lower limit of
utility, which cases are specified by Lemma I.1.
Lemma I.1. `PALt
L `LSL0 if and only if t < tα, where
tα :=
T (θ + p− θp)
θ − θp + ln(δ)
−1W
(
Tp
θp− θ ln(δ) δ
T (θ+p−θp)
θp−θ
)
(10)
and W (·) denotes the Lambert W-function.
Proof. UPALL is strictly monotonic decreasing in t, while U¯L is constant. Further
it is UL
(
`PAL0
)
> U¯L and limt→T UL
(
`PSLt
)
< U¯L. Thus, there is a unique
intersection point tα ∈ (0, T ) for given (p, δ, T ). For t = tα, the tiebreaker rule
in Definition I.1 leads to `LSL0  `PALtα . 
To subsume this subsection, pooling arm’s-length lending is not accepted by
high quality types if δ ≥ δPAL:hi, and it not accepted by low quality types if the
loan is made at t ≥ tα. Since these two conditions differ for the different types,
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it becomes apparent that pooling contracts cannot be offered offhandedly by
banks in a competitive market as banks only break even in intended pooling
loan contracts if the actual pool of borrowers is not riskier than the dedicated
target pool.
2.2.2 Separating Arm’s-Length Loan Contracts
In my model the two different types of individuals are homogeneous groups.
That means that all individuals of a particular type act the same way: either
every individual of type ω prefers and chooses a particular financing option
or none of this type. But individuals of a different type can make different
choices. A pooling contract is, however, no longer pooling different qualities
if not all the individuals choose it regardless of their quality type. If only one
group of individuals chooses an arm’s-length loan contract that is offered to
everyone or to random individuals, we have a separating arm’s-length loan
(SAL) contract. Separating contracts require that individuals do not only differ
in relevant aspects but also know their own characteristic concerning these
aspects. Thus, in my model, the individuals’ knowledge of their own type is
the key assumption to make separating contracts possible. It is, however, also
important that banks, while initially not knowing about the individuals’ type,
are aware of the individuals’ knowledge of their own type.
From Lemma I.1 follows that there is no pooling in an intended PAL with
t ≥ tα since types L prefer their best alternative, `LSL0 , in that case. Hence, the
intended PAL transforms to a separating contract that is only accepted by high
quality individuals if δ < δPAL:hi. But a contract with PAL terms and t ≥ tα is
regularly not the most efficient separating contract possible which I derive in
the following.
The first condition for a separating contract is that it must be feasible and
worse for type L individuals than their best alternative; let us refer to this
condition as first separating condition in the following. The second condition
20
for a separating contract is that it must be preferred by type H individuals
over their best alternative;17 let us refer to this as second separating condition.
Both conditions can only be met if t ≥ tα, as explained in the following. To
satisfy the first separating condition, a separating contract at t < tα would
require worse terms than a PAL that is provided at the same t, as follows
straight from Lemma I.1. But such an intended separating contract would not
be preferred over the PAL by types H and therefore not satisfy the second
separating condition. For t ≥ tα, however, a separating contract with (weakly)
better terms than a PAL can be offered to attract types H while still not
attracting types L.
Let us analyze the first separating condition in more detail in the remainder
of this subsection. A separating contract that provides the loan `SALt at time
t generally satisfies the first separating condition if UL(`SALt ) ≤ U¯L which is
equal to (`SALt + tp)δt ≤ Tp. Rearranging the equation results in the constraint
`SALt ≤ `sept := Tpδ−t − tp. (11)
If this constraint is met, types L are not attracted to an SAL, and if someone
is attracted at all, it is only types H. Therefore, the banks’ participation
constraint in an SAL is equal to the one in an HSL under perfect information,
that is, `SALt ≤ `HSLt = T − t. The stricter of both constraints is binding
in equilibrium, hence we obtain `SALt = min(`
sep
t , `
HSL
t ). Since `
sep
t is strictly
monotonic increasing in t, while `HSLt is strictly monotonic decreasing in t, and
it is `sep0 < `HSL0 but `
sep
T > `
HSL
t→T , there is one unique intersection point of `
sep
t
and `HSLt at tSAL ∈ (0, T ) for given (p, δ, T ), where
tSAL :=
T
1− p + ln(δ)
−1W
(
Tp δT/(p−1) ln(δ)
p− 1
)
. (12)
Thus, to satisfy the first separating condition, the relevant constraint for the
17Otherwise the contract would not be accepted by anyone and therefore not separating
anything.
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SAL contract is `SALt ≤ `HSLt for t ≥ tSAL, and for t < tSAL the relevant
constraint is `SALt ≤ `sept . This is illustrated in Fig. 1a.
Now let us determine the utility maximizing SAL for types H that satisfies
these constraints, as illustrated in Fig. 1b. Since UH(`HSLt ), the utility that
types H obtain from the contract `HSLt , is strictly monotonic decreasing in t,
the best HSL terms that can be achieved in a separating contract are given
by `HSLtSAL . The utility UH(`
sep
t ) is concave in t and has a unique maximum at
t = min[−1/ ln(δ), T ] = tA. As tSAL is also the intersection point of the utilities
UH(`
HSL
t ) and UH(`
sep
t ) for given (p, δ, T ), it follows that the utility maximizing
separating loan is made at time tSAL if tSAL ≤ tA and at time tA if tSAL > tA.
Lemma I.2 proves that tSAL ≤ tA always holds under the assumptions of the
model. Hence, the utility maximizing separating arm’s-length loan contract for
type H individuals is `SALtSAL .
Lemma I.2. tSAL ≤ tA.
Proof. The inequality tSAL ≤ tA can be reduced to
W
(
Tp δT/(p−1) ln(δ)
p− 1
)
≥ T ln(δ)
p− 1 − 1. (13)
Since y = W (x) is a solution to yey = x, it is W−1(y) = yey. Then Eq. (13)
reduces further to
1− p+ T ln(δ) (1− pe) ≥ 0 (14)
which is certainly true if 1− pe ≤ 0. This is equivalent to p ≥ e−1 and therefore
always satisfied according to the model’s assumptions. 
2.2.3 Arm’s-length Lending Equilibrium
While the first separating condition ensures that type L individuals are not
attracted by SAL terms, the second separating condition addresses the question
when such a separating contract is chosen by type H individuals. To answer
this question it is required to compare the best separating contract that has
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(a) Loan contract constraints.
(b) Corresponding utilities for types H.
Figure 1: Constraints of separating arm’s-length loan contracts.
The gray filling shows the space (including borders) where the first separating condition is satisfied.
been derived above with the alternative options of high quality individuals.
These alternatives have been reduced previously to `PAL0 if δ ≤ δPAL:lo, `PALtPAL if
δ ∈ (δPAL:lo, δPAL:hi), and `AT if δ ≥ δPAL:hi.
We can easily assert that autarky with consumption at time T is strictly
dominated by the best separating arm’s-length loan. There is always an SAL
with t = tSAL < T that provides types H with the utility of an HSL. As
obviously UH(`HSLtSAL) = Tδ
tSAL > UH(`
A
T ) = Tδ
T , the autarky option is strictly
inferior.
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Comparing the best SAL with a pooling arm’s-length loan at time t = 0, we
can reduce UH(`PAL0 ) ≥ UH(`SALtSAL) to δ ≤ δι, where
δι := (θ + p− θp)
θ+p−θp
Tθ . (15)
δι < δPAL:lo is always true for the parameter definitions of the model.18 Thus, a
PAL at time t = 0 is both the optimal PAL and preferred over the best SAL
if and only if δ ≤ δι. If, however, δ ∈ (δPAL:lo, δPAL:hi) and the optimal PAL is
therefore given by `PALtPAL , Lemma I.3 proofs that type H individuals prefer the
best SAL in that case, given the parameter definitions of the model.
Lemma I.3. `SALtSAL
H `PALtPAL if δ ∈ (δPAL:lo, δPAL:hi).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Low quality individuals always prefer a PAL at t = 0 over their best alternative
according to Lemma I.1. And they naturally always choose their best alternative
(that is, LSL terms at t = 0) whenever types H choose an SAL, according
to the first condition of a separating contract. Even though banks have no
initial information about individuals’ borrower quality, type L individuals can
at best receive the type-adequate loan terms in that case because an SAL
is perfectly separating and type L individuals’ choice of a different loan is
therefore perfectly type-revealing.
The market equilibrium is finally recorded in Proposition I.2. It shows that
individuals are either both financed with pooling loan contracts at t = 0, or
types H are financed with optimal separating arm’s-length loan contracts,
while types L receive type-adequate loan terms. Even though the equilibrium
is formulated with respect to the time preference measure, which equilibrium
actually emerges depends on all the parameters of the model since δι depends
on all of them.
18δι < δPAL:lo directly follows from Lemma I.3: if δ > δPAL:lo, type H individuals cannot
prefer a PAL at t = 0 over the optimal SAL when the latter is even superior to the best
PAL for that δ.
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Proposition I.2. The competitive arm’s-length lending equilibrium is given by
(
`φt (H), `
φ
t (L)
)
=

(
`PAL0 , `
PAL
0
)
if δ ≤ δι,(
`SALtSAL , `
LSL
0
)
if δ > δι.
(16)
2.3 Savings-linked Relationship Lending
Banks can probabilistically produce information about individuals’ borrower
qualities by observing their saving behavior in a saving relationship. This
information can be used to form groups of individuals on the basis of their
saving behavior over a particular period of time and selectively assign different
loan terms to these different groups. There are numerous conceivable designs of
such savings-linked relationship lending. First, the formation of different groups
of individuals on the basis of their saving behavior can be undertaken in plenty
of different ways. And, second, there are infinitely many ways to selectively set
loan terms for these different groups for which banks’ participation constraint
holds. But whatever design of savings-linked relationship lending is chosen,
there is one fundamental aspect that always has to be considered: the amount
of cross-subsidization between different quality types of individuals. In savings-
linked relationship lending, cross-subsidization can occur inside groups if there
is pooling of different qualities in the groups defined. Or it can occur between
groups if the different loan terms that are assigned to the different groups are
not matching the particular qualities of the groups.
Since the high quality types cross-subsidize the low quality types of a pool,
the former prefer that pooling inside groups is reduced to a minimum by
differentiating between different quality types as precisely as possible when
groups are formed. If it is possible to reduce pooling by a better differentiation,
there is a bank actually doing so in a competitive financing market to attract
the high quality types. Thus, there will be no unnecessary pooling inside groups
in equilibrium. It is shown in the following that pooling inside groups is reduced
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to a minimum if two groups of individuals are defined on the basis of the saving
behavior.
The first group, labeled group F , consists of all the individuals that fail to
save in a saving relationship with a bank. Since type H individuals always
manage to save under the assumptions of the model, not having a flawless saving
track record unambiguously exposes individuals to be of low quality. Thus,
individuals who fail to save during a saving relationship form a homogeneous
group consisting of low quality individuals only.
The second group, labeled group S, consists of all the individuals that exhibit
a flawless saving history in the saving relationship with a bank. Since type L
individuals with a flawless track record cannot be distinguished from types H
on the basis of the information produced, the second group is heterogeneous in
quality and characterized by pooling that cannot be further reduced.
The quality-adequate loan terms for individuals of group F are LSL terms.
Worse loan terms are not feasible because individuals can always receive loans
with LSL terms in the market. Loan terms superior to quality-adequate loan
terms for group F , however, require cross-subsidization between groups at
the expense of group S to satisfy banks’ break-even constraint. This kind of
cross-subsidization is not feasible in equilibrium in a competitive financing
market.
Since LSL terms are the quality-adequate loan terms for type L individuals,
the time when the loan is made to group F is a degree of freedom and not
affecting the terms for group S. According to earlier analysis, individuals of
group F prefer to take out a loan with LSL terms as soon as possible, that is,
in this case, at the time they fail to save in a saving relationship, tf .
We can subsume that, in equilibrium, savings-linked relationship lending is char-
acterized by as less cross-subsidization inside and between groups as possible,
and quality-adequate loan terms for individuals that fail to save in the saving
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relationship with a bank. Thus, the competitive savings-linked relationship
loan, `RLt , follows to be of the general form
`RLt =
`
RL|s
t if saving history is flawless,
`
RL|f
tf
= `LSLtf if saving failure at time tf ∈ (0, t].
(17)
In the model, contingent contracting dominates implicit agreements for the
purpose of implementing savings-linked relationship lending. Whether a bank
actually stands to an implicit agreement depends on the incentives to do so
because there is no explicit contractual obligation. The model framework with
only one generation of individuals and one financing in an individuals life
does (intentionally) not establish reputation effects that are able to enforce
implicit contracts to be binding. As the inside bank is the only one to have
access to private information about an individual’s saving behavior, a so-
called informational lock-in of the individuals can occur which allows banks to
earn profits instead of offering the best possible loan terms to the individuals
(Greenbaum et al., 1989; Sharpe, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Contingent
contracting, however, is comprehensively possible under the assumptions of the
model and leads to ex ante competition between banks over the utilization of the
information that can be produced in a saving relationship. This results in the
best possible loan terms for individuals (as in Boot and Thakor, 1994). Savings-
linked relationship lending is therefore always implemented with contingent
contracts in the equilibrium of the model market.
2.3.1 Pooling Relationship Loan Contracts
A pooling relationship loan contract is by definition accepted by both types of
individuals. Since the loan terms of individuals of group F are quality-adequate,
the loan terms of individuals with impeccable saving histories also require to be
quality-adequate. The conditional probability that an individual with flawless
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saving track record (that is, savings of n monetary units over n periods) is of
high quality is given by
prob(n|H) = θ
θ + (1− θ)pn , (18)
where naturally prob(n|L) = 1−prob(n|H). Hence, the maximum loan volume
of a pooling relationship loan (denoted by PRL) that can be granted at time t
in case of a flawless saving history is given by
`
PRL|s
t = prob(t|H) (T − t) + prob(t|L) (T − t)p
= (T − t)θ + (1− θ)p
t+1
θ + (1− θ)pt .
(19)
Since type H individuals receive the relationship loan `PRL|st with certainty, their
utility from a pooling relationship loan is given by UPRLH = (`
PRL|s
t + t)δ
t. The
utility maximizing PRL for typesH is made at time tPRL := arg maxt∈(0,T ) UPRLH .
If there is no finite real-valued tPRL, a pooling relationship loan contract is
dominated by a pooling arm’s-length loan or by autarky since limt→0 UPRLH =
UH(`
PAL
0 ) and limt→T UPRLH = UH(`AT ).
Type L individuals achieve a flawless saving track record over n periods with
probability pn. The utility they receive from a PRL contains the expected
utility of the contingent loan in case of an impeccable saving history (that is,
loan terms `PRL|stPRL ) and the expected utility of the loan with LSL terms they
take out right after failing in the saving stage at tf . This average LSL (denoted
by ALSL), weighted with the particular probabilities of occurrence, is given by
UALSLL :=
t∑
tf=1
(1− p)ptf−1[(T − tf )p+ tf − 1]δtf (20)
=
δp(1− p)(δtpt − 1)(1 + Tδp− T − δ)
(δp− 1)2 +
δt+1pt(1− p)2t
δp− 1 . (21)
The expected total utility that type L individuals receive from a savings-linked
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pooling relationship loan is therefore given by UPRLL = ptUPRLH + UALSLL .
2.3.2 Separating Relationship Loan Contracts
As for arm’s-length lending, separating relationship loans (denoted by SRL)
need to be considered besides pooling relationship loan contracts. Like in the
case without relationship lending, the first condition for a separating contract is
that the contract must be feasible and worse for type L individuals than their
best alternative. This cannot be attained by changing the loan terms for group
F to terms that are inferior to `LSLtf as it does not change the attractiveness for
types L at all. That is true because every individual can receive LSL terms at
every outside bank at any time, as argued before. Hence, the loan terms for
individuals with flawless saving history, `RL|st , need to be addresses to design a
separating relationship loan contract.
A separating contract that provides the loan `SRL|st at time t to individuals
of group S satisfies the first separating condition if UL(`
SRL|s
t ) ≤ U¯L which is
equal to ptδt
(
`
SRL|s
t + t
)
+ UALSLL (t) ≤ Tp. This rearranges to
`
SRL|s
t ≤ `sep|st :=
Tp− UALSLL (t)
ptδt
− t. (22)
If this constraint is satisfied and, thus, no low quality individuals are attracted
by the contract, banks’ participation constraint for the separating relationship
loan is given by `SRL|st ≤ `HSLt . The stricter of both constraints is crucial for
meeting the first separating condition, and it is binding in equilibrium. Thus,
we obtain `SRL|st = min(`
sep|s
t , `
HSL
t ).
Let us now derive the utility maximizing separating relationship loan contract
that satisfies the first separating condition. UH(`HSLt ) is strictly monotonic
decreasing in t, while UH(`
sep|s
t ) is strictly monotonic increasing in t, where
UH(`
sep|s
t→0 ) < UH(`
HSL
0 ) and UH(`
sep|s
t→T ) > UH(`
HSL
t→T ). Let us denote the unique
intersection point of these utility functions as tSRL ∈ (0, T ) for given (p, δ, T ).
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The maximum feasible utility that type H individuals obtain from a separating
relationship loan is therefore given by `SRL|stSRL and provides HSL terms. Since
`
SRL|s
tSRL
= `HSLtSRL = `
sep|s
tSRL
, the utility maximizing SRL for types H satisfies the first
separating condition.
2.3.3 Relationship Lending Equilibrium
The market equilibrium is derived by comparing the optimal relationship loan
contracts derived above with each other and with the optimal choice in case of
arm’s-length lending (see Proposition I.2). First, it can be shown that the best
separating arm’s-length loan, `SALtSAL , is dominated by the optimal separating
relationship loan, `SRLtSRL . Both loans offer HSL terms, but the SRL offers them
at a sooner time since tSRL < tSAL, which is proven in Lemma I.4. As UH(`HSLt )
is monotonic decreasing in t, an earlier provision of a loan with HSL terms
results in a greater utility for type H individuals.
Lemma I.4. tSRL < tSAL.
Proof. The difference between UH(`
sep|s
t ) and UH(`HSLt ) is naturally zero at
t = tSRL. Further, the difference is strictly monotonic increasing in t since
∂
[
UH(`
sep|s
t )−UH(`HSLt )
]
/∂t > 0. At t = tSAL, the difference can be detected to
be strictly positive, UH(`
sep|s
tSAL
)−UH(`HSLtSAL) > 0. Thus, it follows tSRL < tSAL. 
The remaining three loan contracts form the equilibrium choice of high quality
individuals: the optimal separating relationship loan, the best pooling rela-
tionship loan, and the pooling arm’s-length loan at t = 0. Type H individuals
prefer the best SRL over a PAL at t = 0 if UH(`SRLtSRL) > UH(`
PAL
0 ) which reduces
to the condition
δ > δS := (θ + p+ θp)
1/tSRL . (23)
The optimal SRL is always preferred over the best PRL by typesH if tPRL ≥ tSRL
since ∂UH(`HSLt )/∂t < 0 and the optimal SRL provides HSL terms, whereas a
PRL can, due to imperfect probabilistic learning, only converge to HSL terms
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with increasing t. In general, UH(`SRLtSRL) > UH(`
PRL
tPRL
) is true whenever δ > δRL,
where I define
δRL :=

(
(1−θ)(T−tPRL)p1+tPRL+(1−θ)ptPRL tPRL+Tθ
T (θ+ptPRL−θptPRL )
)1/(tSRL−tPRL)
if tPRL < tSRL,
0 otherwise.
(24)
The best PRL provides greater utility than a PAL at t = 0 if UH(`PRLtPRL) >
UH(`
PAL
0 ) which transforms to the condition
δ > δP :=
(
T (θ + p− θp)(θ + ptPRL − θptPRL)
(1− θ)ptPRL [Tp+ (1− p)tPRL] + Tθ
)1/tPRL
. (25)
The equilibrium is finally stated in Proposition I.3. Apparently we find pooling
arm’s-length loans instantly provided to all the individuals in equilibrium if
their time preference is sufficiently large (and the time preference measure, δ,
therefore sufficiently small). Otherwise, pooling or separating relationship loan
contracts prevail in equilibrium. Whether the relationship loan contracts are
pooling or separating depends heavily on the borrower quality in the market,
that is, on θ and p.
Proposition I.3. The competitive market equilibrium with savings-linked rela-
tionship lending is given by
(
`φt (H), `
φ
t (L)
)
=

(
`PAL0 , `
PAL
0
)
if δ ≤ min(δP, δS),(
`PRLtPRL , `
PRL
tPRL
)
if δP < δ ≤ δRL,(
`SRLtSRL , `
LSL
0
)
otherwise.
(26)
2.4 Parametric Results and Economic Efficiency
To interpret the model’s solution, let us calculate and examine the equilibrium
in the full parameter space (θ× p) and for reasonable values of time preference
in this section. Regarding the time preference, it is important to recall that
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the time preference parameter, δ, is modeled as a per-period measure. And the
time span of a period is by definition given by individuals’ saving frequency
whose unit is not specified. For manageability, however, type L individuals
are modeled to save one monetary unit or nothing in one period, no matter
how this period is defined. That means that the unit of the saving frequency
does not influence the probabilistic process of saving in the model and the
quality of the saving signal is not affected. Because of this invariance of the
stochastic process of saving, a ceteris paribus comparison of equilibria that
arise for different units of the saving frequency is not smoothly possible in
my model. The model is rather designed to study savings-linked relationship
lending in a multi-period context for a given saving frequency. For a saving
frequency of n years, the time preference measure for a given annual rate of
individuals’ time preference, rp.a.δ , generally calculates as δ = (1 + r
p.a.
δ )
−n. Since
household incomes, major expenses, savings, and credit repayments are in fact
mostly cash-flows that occur on a monthly (or sometimes weekly) basis over
several years, the model specifically aims to analyze a monthly (or weekly)
saving frequency. Thus, although I generally solved the model for T ≥ 2, the
model is intended to analyze situations of much larger T , for instance monthly
saving and debt repayment over several years.
If we consider a monthly saving frequency, the corresponding annual time
preference rates, rp.a.δ , to some particular time preference factors, δ, are given in
Table 1. Different empirical studies find strongly varying rates of time preference,
which presumably is due to differences in elicitation techniques (see Frederick
et al., 2002). Although, we can uncritically assess that, for a monthly saving
frequency, focusing on results for δ ≥ 0.9 in the parametric analysis of this
section entails no loss of generality.
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibria of the model according to Propositions I.2
and I.3 in the parameter space (θ × p) by showing isoquant maps of the
equilibrium-determining variables. The arm’s-length lending equilibrium is
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δ 0.9 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.995 0.999
rp.a.δ 254.1% 85.1% 27.4% 12.8% 6.2% 1.2%
Table 1: Annual rate of time preference, rp.a.δ , and per-period measure of time
preference, δ, for a monthly saving frequency.
presented in Figure 2a by the isoquant map of δι (solid black lines), the
corresponding level is noted above the particular line. Fillings visualize the
equilibrium for δ = 0.99. For a given δ, I find separating arm’s-length lending,
(`SALtSAL , `
LSL
0 ), below a particular isoquant of δι (or in the darkgray space for
δ = 0.99) and pooling arm’s-length lending, (`PAL0 , `PAL0 ), above a particular
isoquant of δι (or in the white space for δ = 0.99).
Figure 2b illustrates savings-linked relationship lending equilibrium by showing
the relevant19 parts of the isoquant maps of δS (solid black lines), of δP (solid
gray lines), and of δRL (dashed black and solid black lines)20. The graph is
calculated for T = 40 but the relationship lending equilibrium hardly differs
for any T ≥ 25; to illustrate this, Appendix B presents the graph for a range
of different T . That means that, in terms of a monthly saving frequency, the
results based on Figure 2b are thoroughly valid for any loan with a credit
period of more than two years.21
The dotted gray line in Figure 2b marks all the points where the different
isoquants of the same level intersect; the level is noted at the corresponding
intersection point. Given a particular level of time preference δ, according to
Proposition I.3 we find separating relationship lending in equilibrium in the
parameter space that is left of the particular dashed black and solid black line,
pooling relationship lending is chosen in the parameter space that is right of
(and on) the particular dashed black line while also being below the particular
solid gray line, and pooling arm’s-length loans are the equilibrium choice in the
19The ‘relevant’ part of a particular isoquant is the part that is an actual border between
different equilibrium choices in the parameter space (θ, p), pursuant to Proposition I.3.
20While the relevant part of δS obviously lies exactly on δRL, the non-relevant part does not.
21Although the graph differs somehow for very small T < 25, some main conclusions still
remain valid even in this case.
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(a) Arm’s-length lending equilibrium.
Isoquant map of δι (solid black), fillings conform to δ = 0.99 (darkgray: SAL,
white: PAL).
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(b) Savings-linked relationship lending equilibrium.
Relevant parts of the isoquant maps of δS (solid black), δP (solid gray), and
δRL (dashed black and solid black) for T = 40. Fillings conform to δ = 0.99
(darkgray: SRL, lightgray: PRL, white: PAL).
Figure 2: Parametric illustration of the model equilibria (for T = 40).
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Figure 3: Isoquant map of average and relative borrower quality.
Solid black : average borrower quality, dashed gray: relative borrower quality. Similar colored arrows point in
the particular direction of increase.
parameter space above (and on) the particular solid black and the solid gray
line. Filled areas visualize the equilibrium for δ = 0.99, where the darkgray
region conforms to equilibra with separating relationship lending, (`SRLtSRL , `
LSL
0 ),
the lightgray colored parameter space is the one where pooling relationship
lending occurs, (`PRLtPRL , `
PRL
tPRL
), and the white space covers equilibria of pooling
arm’s-length lending, (`PAL0 , `PAL0 ). One can directly recognized that, the larger
δ (that is, the lower the time preference of the individuals), the larger the
parameter space where savings-linked relationship lending is preferred over
arm’s-length lending in equilibrium.
Figure 3 illustrates isoquant maps of the average borrower quality (solid black
lines) and the relative borrower quality (dashed gray lines). Let us define the
average borrower quality, q¯, of the market to be the expected repayment of
a simple loan of volume one that is provided to random individuals. Let the
relative borrower quality, qr, be defined as the ratio of this repayment’s fraction
that is expected to be made by high quality individuals’ to the repayment’s
35
fraction that is expected to come from low quality individuals. Formally,
q¯ := θ + (1− θ)p, (27)
qr := θ/(p− θp). (28)
An isoquant of q¯, as plotted in Fig. 3, contains all points (θ, p) that result in
the same expected repayment of the simple loan of volume one. An isoquant of
qr contains all combinations (θ, p) that result in the same ratio of repayment
fractions of the simple loan. Thus, an isoquant at level q¯ or qr is given by
p(q¯) = (q¯ − θ)/(1 − θ) or p(qr) = θ/(qr − qrθ). The level of average borrower
quality increases towards the upper right hand corner, (1, 1), and the level of
relative borrower quality increases towards the lower right hand corner, (1, 0).
Comparing Fig. 2b and Fig. 3 discloses a distinct relationship between market
equilibrium and borrower quality. While the average borrower quality essentially
determines if the equilibrium is composed of arm’s-length lending or relationship
lending, the relative borrower quality basically determines if we find pooling
or separating relationship lending in equilibrium. Hence, if the market is
characterized by high average borrower quality, we can only find savings-linked
relationship lending in equilibrium if individuals possess a low rate of time
preference (that is, a large δ). If the market, however, is characterized by low
average borrower quality, savings-linked relationship lending is already viable
for higher rates of time preference. A high (low) relative borrower quality
resolves the further choice between pooling and separating relationship lending
in favor of the former (latter). This leads to Theorem I.1.
Theorem I.1. Savings-linked relationship lending is generally an equilibrium
choice in markets of low average borrower quality or in markets of low time
preference. Further, savings-linked relationship lending is rather a separating
(pooling) equilibrium if relative borrower quality is low (high).
Savings-linked relationship lending requires a saving relationship with the
individuals prior to the provision of the loan. That means that individuals
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who enter such a contract agree to postpone their consumption although they
could receive an arm’s-length loan instantly. Rational individuals only do so if
relationship lending enables more or better, albeit later, consumption. Thus,
the time preference measure, δ, acts as a trade-off parameter between time of
consumption and quality of consumption. Individuals who choose savings-linked
relationship lending prefer quality of consumption over time of consumption.
When comparing the savings-linked relationship lending equilibrium (Fig. 2b) as
stated by Proposition I.3 with the arm’s-length lending equilibrium (Fig. 2a) of
Proposition I.2, we can assess the effects of savings-linked relationship lending
on economic efficiency which are subsumed in Theorem I.2 and amplified
thereafter.
Theorem I.2. In equilibrium, savings-linked relationship lending leads to a
Pareto improvement or an increasing allocative efficiency of the financing
market compared to arm’s-length lending.
Savings-linked relationship lending constitutes a Pareto improvement over
separating arm’s-length contracts since high quality individuals would not
choose relationship lending in equilibrium if it was inferior to separating arm’s-
length loans, of course. Low quality types obtain their lower limit of utility
whenever high quality types choose a separating arm’s-length loan and can
therefore not get worse.
Savings-linked relationship lending does not lead to a Pareto improvement in
comparison to pooling arm’s-length lending in the basic model. But information
production from individuals’ saving behavior prior to lending allows banks
to offer more quality-adequate or even perfectly quality-adequate loan terms.
Thus, the inherent cross-subsidization from high to low quality individuals in
pooling arm’s-length lending can be reduced. This naturally reduces the utility
of low quality types and increases that of high quality ones in comparison
to pooling arm’s-length lending where cross-subsidization is maximized. The
importance of the increasing allocative efficiency that relationship lending can
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induce is not salient enough in the basic model since there is always financing
for every individual and, therefore, the distribution of wealth is addressed more
than the formation of social welfare. In Section 3.2 the model is modified in
this regard to highlight the relevance of efficient allocation of capital in the
context of this work.
3 Modifications to the Model and Robustness
3.1 Symmetric Unawareness of Borrower Quality
If we change the model’s assumptions with regard to individuals’ knowledge of
their own type, the results change significantly. Let us assume that individuals
are not aware of their own type but, like banks, only of the fraction θ of high
quality type individuals in the population. This assumption of symmetric un-
awareness of borrower quality causes separating loan contracts to be impossible.
The expected utility that individuals receive from financing alternative φ is
calculated as a weighted average of the utility of low quality types and that of
high quality types:
E
[
U
(
`φt
)]
= θ UH
(
`φt
)
+ (1− θ)UL
(
`φt
)
. (29)
As ∂E
[
U
(
`PALt
)]
/∂t = T log(δ)(θ + p − θp)δt < 0, the expected utility that
type-unaware individuals obtain from a pooling arm’s-length loan is maximized
for the lower limit of t which is t = 0. Thus, we obtain `PAL0  `PALt ∀t ∈ (0, T )
for type-unaware individuals. Comparing the expected utility from that optimal
pooling arm’s-length loan with the expected utility from autarky, we can assess
the difference of the particular expected utilities, E
[
U
(
`PAL0
)]− E[U(`At )] =
(T − tδt) (θ + (1 − θ)p), to be obviously always positive for the parameter
definitions in this model. Hence, type-unaware individuals have the preference
relation `PAL0  `At ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
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It follows that in a market of arm’s-length lending to type-unaware individuals,
only instantly provided pooling arm’s-length loans, `PAL0 , are found in equilib-
rium in the whole parameter space of the model. And this result is still valid if
savings-linked relationship lending is considered, as Proposition I.4 proofs.
Proposition I.4. Type-unaware individuals prefer arm’s-length lending over
savings-linked relationship lending.
Proof. It is limt→0 E
[
U
(
`PRLt
)]
= T (θ + p − θp) = E[U(`PAL0 )]. The utility
function E
[
U
(
`PRLt
)]
has exactly one unique global maximum at some t∗ ∈ R
for the parameter definitions in this model. Thus, if the first partial derivative
of E
[
U
(
`PRLt
)]
with respect to t is negative at t = 0, it is `PRLt1  `PRLt2 ∀t1 < t2,
where t1, t2 ∈ (0, T ), and the optimal PAL, `PAL0 , is preferred. There can only
be a feasible PRL, `PRLt>0 , that provides greater utility than the best PAL,
`PAL0 , if the mentioned first partial derivative at t = 0 is positive. Solving(
∂E
[
U
(
`PRLt
)]
/∂t
)∣∣
t=0
> 0 for T gives the condition T < Tκ(θ, p, δ), where
Tκ(θ, p, δ) :=
(1− θ)(1− p)(1− δ)[1− δp+ δp( log(δ) + log(p))]
(δp− 1)[(1− θ)(1− δ)p log(p) + (θ + p(1− θ − δ)) log(δ)] .
(30)
Maximizing Tκ(θ, p, δ) in the parameter space of the model yields Tˆκ(θ → 0, p =
e−1, δ → 1) = e− 2. In the multi-period model we have T ≥ 2 and thus it is
always T > Tκ(θ, p, δ). 
From Proposition I.4 follows that savings-linked relationship lending is irrelevant
in a market with type-unaware agents. Individuals’ knowledge of their own
quality type is therefore a necessary condition for savings-linked relationship
lending to be meaningful. That also means that separating contracts cannot be
neglected whenever savings-linked relationship lending is considered.
3.2 Adverse Selection
The basic model, as formulated and solved above, does not contain adverse
selection problems. There is always financing for every individual in equilibrium.
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This is true in the first best solution, in the arm’s-length lending equilibrium,
and as well in the equilibrium with savings-linked relationship lending. I in-
tentionally solved the model neglecting factors that lead to adverse selection,
that is, situations where financing is not possible for or not accepted by one or
both groups of individuals. The reason for doing so is that a supplementary
introduction and discussion of such factors might provide a more transparent
and more versatile insight to the problem. This section seeks to slightly modify
the basic model to create the possibility of non-financing equilibria due to
adverse selection. This can be achieved by introducing a reservation utility for
high quality individuals and a quality floor of good G into the basic model.
Let us define RUH to be the reservation utility of type H individuals. If a
financing option φ provides weakly less utility than the reservation utility RUH ,
types H do not choose financing option φ. It seems reasonable to define the
reservation utility relative to the market environment, that is, the reservation
utility differs for different values of the parameters (θ, p, δ, T ).22 To have an
impact on the equilibrium, the reservation utility of types H needs to be at least
as large as their lower limit of utility, U¯H , which is given by a pooling arm’s-
length loan made at t = 0, thus U¯H = UH(`PAL0 ). Further, the reservation utility
of types H should be assumed not to exceed the utility that they receive from
the first best solution, otherwise the consumption of good G is not preferable
at all for high quality individuals. Hence, we obtain RUH ∈ [U¯H , T ). With this
definition, the following two situation can emerge for a given parameter set
(θ, p, δ, T ) if such a reservation utility is introduced. First, neither arm’s-length
lending nor relationship lending is accepted by typeH individuals in equilibrium.
Second, arm’s-length lending is not possible in equilibrium but relationship
lending is. As a result, if the reservation utility of high quality individuals is
sufficiently large to affect the equilibrium for a given parameter set (θ, p, δ, T ),
22Defining the reservation utility as a constant absolute number, independent from the
market environment, is basically equivalent to just cutting out the parameter space that is
characterized by generally lower utility levels. I do not a see a serious economic application
to this approach.
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financing can only occur in the form of savings-linked relationship lending in
equilibrium.
Introducing a reservation utility for low quality individuals is not capable of
affecting the equilibrium since their reservation utility would require to be
above their quality-adequate utility to have an impact, which seems to be a
surreal situation. Let us therefore just define RUL = U¯L in order to get a clear
analysis. Instead, to create an impact on the equilibrium, we can address types
L by introducing a quality floor of good G, denoted Qmin. That simply means
that it is not possible, not reasonable, or not desirable to consume less than
Qmin of G. For notational convenience let us assume that the consumption
quality of good G needs to strictly exceed Qmin. Such a quality floor only
impacts the equilibrium if it weakly exceeds the consumption quality that type
L individuals obtain from their lower limit of utility, which is equivalent to
U¯L.23 To avoid affecting types H with the introduction of a quality floor and
overriding their reservation utility that I have currently introduced, let the
quality floor be below the quality that types H obtain in their lower-limit case,
which happens to be U¯H . We finally get Qmin ∈ [U¯L, U¯H). With such a quality
floor of good G that has an impact on the equilibrium, low quality individuals
can only purchase and consume good G in pooling equilibria with sufficient
cross-subsidization from types H. Further, if Qmin > U¯L, separating contracts
become possible for lower t. They are therefore more attractive for high quality
individuals and found in equilibrium in a larger parameter space than before.
With these two modifications—reservation utility for types H and quality
floor of good G—the model entails the following typical literature cases of
adverse selection problems: first, low quality agents cannot be financed on
their own and, second, collective pooling of all agents (or random agents) does
not work because of adverse selection. The minimum extent of modification
23Type L individuals’ lower limit of utility is a type-adequate loan provided at t = 0.
Thus, there is neither discounting nor saving and the consumption quality is equal to
U¯L = UL(`
LSL
0 ) = `
LSL
0 .
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to achieve this is given by the borderline cases RUH = U¯H and Qmin = U¯L
which allow a particularly straightforward comparison with the equilibria of
the basic model. In the first best solution, low quality individuals can no longer
be financed since they ask for a loan of at least Qmin that cannot be granted to
them; types H still receive financing with type-adequate loan terms at time
t = 0. In the arm’s-length lending equilibrium, financing can now only occur in
separating contracts. There is a financing market failure whenever a pooling
loan would be the utility maximizing contract since high quality individuals do
not accept general pooling terms and separating contracts require too costly
signaling in that case. When adding savings-linked relationship lending, we
find financing either with separating relationship contracts or with pooling
relationship contracts in equilibrium. The latter case is special because it is the
only case, given the modifications of this section, where low quality individuals
can receive financing in the model equilibrium (if they successfully save in the
saving relationship prior to the loan, of course).24
It becomes evident that, with the constraints of this section, savings-linked
relationship lending does always result in a Pareto improvement compared to
arm’s-length lending. In the parameter space where relationship lending did not
result in a Pareto improvement but in an improved allocative efficiency in the
basic model, this higher allocative efficiency now results in a Pareto improvement
under the new constraints. Additionally and recorded in Theorem I.3, savings-
linked relationship lending can overcome the market failure of arm’s-length
lending that the modifications of this section induce. This follows from the fact
that the best separating arm’s-length contract is strictly dominated by savings-
linked relationship lending (see Lemma I.4 and subsequent elaboration) and,
thus, there surely is a non-empty parameter space that allows savings-linked
relationship lending (separating or pooling) in equilibrium while arm’s-length
financing breaks down.
24This case, however, does not exist if the reservation utility of types H is even too large to
have them accept the semi-pooling loan terms of pooling relationship lending.
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Theorem I.3. Savings-linked relationship lending can overcome financing
market failure due to adverse selection and enable financing when arm’s-length
lending is not viable in equilibrium.
3.3 Robustness to Financing Volume
Let us regard the model’s total number of periods, T , as time span in which
individuals are able and willing to regularly assign savings to payments that
are related to good G.25 If individuals desire to acquire a higher priced good
G, they have to assign savings over a longer time span because the greater T ,
ceteris paribus, the more funds are available in total for the purchase of good
G with or without credit financing. Large T therefore correspond to financing
volumes that are large compared to households’ periodic saving potential which,
in turn, can be considered to be positively related to income. To examine the
robustness of savings-linked relationship lending and its efficiency to changes
in financing volume, I analyze the model’s equilibria for different T in the
following.
As stated in Proposition I.2, the arm’s-length lending equilibrium is determined
by δι which is functionally dependent on T . It is ∂δι/∂T > 0, and limT→0 δι = 0,
limT→∞ δι = 1. It follows that δι not only increases with increasing T but also
changes significantly over its whole domain of definition. Thus, the arm’s-length
lending equilibrium also changes significantly for changes in T , that is, for
different financing volumes. The higher T , the more predominant are pooling
contracts in the arm’s-length lending equilibrium. Figure 4 illustrates the arm’s-
length lending equilibrium for different T on the right-hand side. The left-hand
side of Fig. 4 shows the savings-linked relationship lending equilibrium for
different T . Lines and fillings are used similar to those in Fig. 2. The lines in
each subfigure are isoquants of the equilibrium-determining variables at the
levels marked in Fig. 4b.
25Using T as life span in the basic model is solely for modeling convenience since the model
does not aim at studying the relationship between life span and relationship lending.
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(d) T →∞.
Figure 4: Equilibria for savings-linked relationship lending (left) and arm’s-length
lending (right) for different T .
Fillings (for δ = 0.99): darkgray left : SRL, lightgray: PRL, white: PAL, darkgray right : SAL. Lines: solid
black left : δS, solid gray: δP, dashed black and solid black left : δRL, solid black right : δι.
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In contrast to arm’s-length lending, the savings-linked relationship lending
equilibrium is obviously very robust to changes in T and does hardly alter for
any T ≥ 25. When considering constraints that lead adverse selection problems,
as done in Section 3.2, financing fails whenever pooling arm’s-length lending is
predominant (that is, in the white parameter space in Fig. 4 for δ = 0.99). We
see that arm’s-length lending fails increasingly for increasing relative financing
volumes, while the savings-linked relationship lending equilibrium is robust to
increasing T , ceteris paribus. Hence, savings-linked relationship lending shows
to be of exceeding economic value for financing volumes that are large in
comparison to households’ periodic savings or income. Theorem I.4 subsumes.
Theorem I.4. Savings-linked relationship lending can overcome financing
market failure due to adverse selection particularly for financing volumes that
are large in comparison to households’ periodic savings or incomes.
4 Savings-linked Relationship Lending for Housing Fi-
nance
4.1 Application of the Model and Implications
Housing can be considered a good in the sense of my model as it is a an
expenditure that requires saving or lending and is generally not acquired on a
regular basis in an individual’s life. Plus, demand for housing is well known
to show a positive income elasticity, which is in line with my assumptions.
Of course, housing finance is usually not operated completely unsecured in
contrast to the model’s assumption. But this assumption allows to highlight
the role of private information in relationship lending and to isolate the result
from well-known effects of collateral. My model and its results can therefore
generally be applied to housing finance. In Section 3.3 I found savings-linked
relationship lending to be particularly well suited for housing finance. That is
because housing usually requires large expenditures compared to households’
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periodic savings or incomes and, while arm’s-length lending is more likely to
break down in this scenario due to effects of adverse selection, savings-linked
relationship lending remains hardly affected.
The idea of savings-linked relationship lending is applied in the real world in the
form of contractual saving for housing. CSH contracts are basically very similar
to the equilibrium contracts of savings-linked relationship lending in my model:
in a contractual saving stage, savings are regularly transferred to the providing
bank over a particular time horizon before a loan is made contingent on the
saving behavior. Since savings-linked relationship lending can be identified
to be a central element of CSH, CSH shares the economic efficiency that my
model indentifies for savings-linked relationship lending. My work is to my best
knowledge the first to rigorously explain CSH and its economic value purely in
terms of relationship lending. Further, the model can be used to evaluate CSH
for different markets. This is of interest because CSH actually exists in highly
developed economies (like Austria, France, Germany) as well as in transition
economies (like China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania).
To give a more contextual interpretation of the model’s results, let us presume
a positive correlation between the developedness of an economy and its average
borrower quality. Savings-linked relationship lending is therefore likely to be an
economically beneficial equilibrium choice in transition economies where the
average borrower quality is typically rather low. But the model also shows that
savings-linked relationship lending can be an economically beneficial equilibrium
choice in highly developed economies with high average borrower quality if time
preference regarding housing is sufficiently low. This, for instance, is a quite
appropriate characterization of the German market where CSH flourished over
many centuries.26 These results sharply contrast the view of Lea and Renaud
(1995) that “a CSH-system would have no justification in fully developed and
competitive financial markets today.”
26A recent study by Wang et al. (2016) of time preferences in 53 countries indicates that
time preference in Germany is comparatively low.
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Products of housing finance for private households are politically often also
evaluated in terms of their coverage in society. With adverse selection problems
due to the constraints of Section 3.2, pooling savings-linked relationship lending
is characterized by more lending compared to the arm’s-length solution and,
moreover, it also leads to more lending compared to the first best solution.
While adverse selection only allows lending to high quality individuals in the
first best world, pooling savings-linked relationship contracts additionally allow
lending to low quality individuals who accomplish to save consistently. This
equilibrium overinvestment can be socially or politically desirable for housing
finance in order to promote home ownership.
4.2 State Subsidy
It appears to be a traditional concern of governments to promote home owner-
ship. This is inter alia done by subsidizing products of housing finance. State
subsidy for CSH exists and is common in economies where CSH is found. This
section introduces state subsidy to the model framework to analyze its general
effects on savings-linked relationship lending. My partial equilibrium model is,
however, not particularly designed and suited to analyze state subsidy and can
therefore not accomplish the derivation of detailed conditions for optimal state
subsidy or the analysis of comprehensive welfare outcomes.
It has previously been shown that the possibility of learning about individuals’
borrower quality is a crucial element of savings-linked relationship lending,
even if information production is costly. Hence, state subsidy for savings-
linked relationship lending in general, or for contractual saving for housing
in particular, should increase the attractiveness of such contracts without
diluting their informational benefits. That means that the subsidies should be
perfectly distinguishable from individuals’ savings to maintain banks’ abilities
to produce information from individuals’ saving behavior. We call such state
subsidy information-neutral.
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Actual state subsidy for contractual saving for housing, as in Austria and
Germany, can be considered information-neutral in this sense. In Germany, for
instance, the direct state subsidies (Arbeitnehmersparzulage and Wohnungs-
bauprämie) are basically add-on payments to individuals’ contractual savings
in the saving stage of a CSH and they are transferred directly to CSH saving
accounts of subsidized individuals. The same is true for the Austrian direct
state subsidy of CSH (Bausparprämie). Hence, banks can perfectly distinguish
between savings and subsidies and information production from individuals’
saving behavior is not diluted.
To incorporate state subsidy for savings-linked relationship lending into the
model, let us define λ(t) > 0 as the total state subsidy that every individual
receives with the relationship loan at the time, t, the loan is made. To ensure
that state subsidy is information-neutral, the subsidy payments are transferred
directly to individuals’ saving accounts. If individuals do not obtain the re-
lationship loan, the subsidy is not provided, which is consistent with actual
subsidy of CSH (for instance in Germany) and is in line with the underlying
objective to promote home ownership. In my model such state subsidy enables
higher consumption quality (which means higher quality housing in the con-
text of housing finance) for individuals with a successful saving stage. But as
individuals’ future debt service potential remains unchanged, the subsidy does
not affect the general conditions of pooling relationship lending. Thus, with
subsidy, the utility functions for savings-linked pooling relationship lending
merely differ by the expected discounted subsidy. Using a a breve accent to
mark that subsidy is considered, we obtain
U˘PRLH = U
PRL
H + δ
tλ(t), (31)
U˘PRLL = U
PRL
L + p
tδtλ(t). (32)
The optimal pooling relationship loan, ˘`PRL
t˘PRL
, for type H individuals usually
differs with state subsidy compared to a market without subsidy. Actually,
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U˘PRLH and UPRLH only share the same maximum if the subsidy function is of the
form λ(t) = c δ−t, where c is a constant.
Since state subsidy obviously improves savings-linked relationship lending for
low quality individuals in case of a successful saving stage, while their lower
limit of utility (which they expect to receive when they fail in the saving stage)
remains unaffected, the constraint for not attracting low quality individuals
with a separating relationship contact, as originally stated by Eq. (22), changes
with state subsidy λ(t) to
˘`SRL|s
t ≤ ˘`sep|st :=
Tp− UALSLL (t)
ptδt
− t− λ(t) = `sep|st − λ(t). (33)
Banks’ participation constraint for separating contracts remains unaffected.
The first separating condition for SRL contracts with state subsidy therefore
requires ˘`SRL|st = min(˘`
sep|s
t , `
HSL
t ). Obviously, it is ˘`
sep|s
t < `
sep|s
t . But since type
H individuals receive the state subsidy λ(t) at time t with probability of 1
in subsidized relationship lending, the subsidy fully compensates the smaller
loan volume ˘`sep|st and the corresponding utility is the same as without state
subsidy, U˘H(˘`
sep|s
t ) = UH(`
sep|s
t ) ∀t. Due to the subsidy, however, the utility
that type H individuals obtain from loan terms `HSLt increases, U˘H(`HSLt ) >
UH(`
HSL
t ) ∀t ∈ (0, T ). Recalling the properties of UH(`sep|st ) and UH(`HSLt )—the
former is monotonic increasing in t, the latter is monotonic decreasing in t,
and they intersect once at tSRL in the domain t ∈ (0, T )—, we see that type
H individuals’ utility maximizing SRL contract in case of state subsidy is
consequently characterized by declined loan terms (smaller loan at a later time)
but increased utility in comparison to the equilibrium SRL contract in a market
without state subsidy. This result is illustrated by Fig. 5.
To conclude, state subsidy for savings-linked relationship lending, of course,
causes relationship lending to be more attractive for individuals. But for sepa-
rating relationship contracts and—depending on the subsidy function—mostly
also for pooling relationship contracts, state subsidy induces that individuals
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(a) Loan contract constraints.
(b) Corresponding utilities for types H.
Figure 5: The effect of state subsidy on the constraints of separating savings-linked
relationship loan contracts.
The gray filling shows the space (including borders) where the first separating condition is satisfied.
choose inferior loan terms. That means that only a fraction of the subsidy’s
value is converted into utility, and the other part is just compensating inferior
loan terms. Thus, we encounter a deadweight loss due to state subsidy. This
loss may be acceptable if the subsidy serves another objective that is supposed
to yield positive social effects that are not captured by my partial equilibrium
model. Such an objective could be the promotion of home ownership. In the
basic model, where every individual can always receive financing, subsidy can
clearly not improve home ownership rates. For that matter let us in the follow-
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ing discuss the modified model market that entails adverse selection problems
due to the modifications of Section 3.2.
With all or some of the constraints of Section 3.2, state subsidy for savings-linked
relationship lending can overcome adverse selection and effect a transition from
a non-financing equilibrium to a financing equilibrium and therefore accomplish
the objective to promote home ownership.27 Home ownership rates also rise if
introducing state subsidy causes a transition from a separating equilibrium to a
pooling financing equilibrium (for instance, from separating relationship lending
to pooling relationship lending). But state subsidy for savings-linked relationship
lending can also have inverse effects and reduce home ownership. This is the case
if the state subsidy results in a transition from pooling financing to a separating
solution.28 Such an undesired transition can, for instance, happen over time if
the market environment (e.g. the average/relative borrower quality or the time
preference) changes, while the subsidy is not adjusted, since a state subsidy that
leads to increasing home ownership rates in one market environment (through
desired equilibrium transition) can reduce them in another (through undesired
equilibrium transition).
5 Conclusion
Producing private information about households through repeated lending
is often not a very promising approach since they prevalently possess very
thin credit track records or no credit track records at all when they demand
financing. Instead, as I argued, relationship lenders can gather credit-relevant
information about households in saving relationships prior to lending. I modeled
and analyzed such savings-linked relationship lending to private households in
27This can particularly be the case in the parameter space in which pooling arm’s-length
lending is found in the basic model’s equilibrium because an effective reservation utility of
types H leads to non-financing in that space, as argued in Section 3.2.
28With the constraints of Section 3.2, this is the case for a transition from PRL (where all
high quality individuals and some type L individuals purchase housing) to SRL (where
only type H individuals purchase housing).
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a multi-period context. I identified market environments where savings-linked
relationship lending is found in equilibrium. These environments are generally
characterized by low time preference or low average borrower quality, and
they show improvements in market efficiency in comparison to arm’s-length
lending. Savings-linked relationship lending can also overcome financing market
failure due to adverse selection and enable financing when arm’s-length lending
is not viable in equilibrium, which is particularly true for financing volumes
that are large in comparison to households’ periodic savings or incomes. This
characteristic makes savings-linked relationship lending particularly well suited
for housing finance of private households.
Contractual saving for housing, an important product of housing finance in Con-
tinental Europe, shares major characteristics with savings-linked relationship
lending. My analysis is therefore capable of giving a theoretical relationship
lending explanation for CSH, which has to my best knowledge not been done
before in the literature. This helps to generate a better understanding of CSH,
which is important for two reasons. First, it allows to rethink and adapt CSH
in changing market environments without destroying or diluting the integral
value of the concept that accounts for a substantial share of housing finance in
several European economies. Plus, policy makers are able to effectively plan
and assess the introduction of CSH-like concepts and state subsidies for CSH.
Second, centralized financial regulation is prone to overlook and violate specific
features of regional financial products and concepts, especially if these are not
fully understood. In order to enable regulators to make differentiated decisions,
the economic benefits and shortcomings of financial concepts like CSH need to
be elaborated. My work is one step further in that direction.
Future empirical research could address the validity of my results by applying
the model to European transition economies that implemented contractual
saving for housing several years ago. The model could help to disclose why the
implementation was a success for some of the economies, while it was not for
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others (as reviewed by Diamond, 1998).
Savings-linked relationship lending could also be an economically beneficial
concept for another reason that is not considered and studied in this work
but is worth future research. A saving relationship that precedes lending may
not just convey information about households’ borrower qualities to banks. It
could also teach financial discipline to individuals. The remuneration of lending
when not failing to save could incentivise agents to regularly save in a saving
relationship and thereby sustainably increase their borrower quality.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma I.3.
The condition UH
(
`SALtSAL
) ≤ UH(`PALtPAL) is given by
Tδ
T
1−p+ln(δ)
−1W
(
Tp δT/(p−1) ln(δ)
p−1
)
≤ (1− θ)(1− p) δ
−T (θ+p−θp)
(1−θ)(1−p)
−e ln(δ) . (34)
The PAL at tPAL is only relevant if δ ∈ (δPAL:lo, δPAL:hi). Thus, let us substitute
δ = exp
(
(1− θ)(1− p)[y (1− θ)(1− p)− 1]
T (p+ θ − θp)
)
(35)
which gives δ ∈ (δPAL:lo, δPAL:hi) if y ∈ (0, 1). We can now transform Eq. (34) to
pey(1−θ)(1−p)
[
y(1− θ)(1− p)− 1]2 − (θ + p− θp)[py(θ + p− θp)− y + 1]
(1− θ)−1 (θ + p− θp)2
− ln
(
θ + p− θp
1− y(1− θ)(1− p)
)
≤ 0.
(36)
This inequation is never true for y ∈ (0, 1) if p ≥ 1/3 and therefore clearly never
true under the assumption p ≥ e−1. Figure 6 illustrates in gray the parameter
space (θ × p) where the inequation can be satisfied for y ∈ (0, 1). Q.E.D.
Figure 6: Space in (θ × p) where UH
(
`PALtPAL
) ≥ UH(`SALtSAL) is possible (gray).
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Appendix B. Parametric Illustration of Savings-linked Re-
lationship Lending Equilibria for Different T
Figure 7 illustrates the savings-linked relationship lending equilibrium, similar
to Fig. 2b, for a range of different T . Lines and fillings are used similar to
Fig. 2b. Apparently the results do not change substantially for T ≥ 25.
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(f) T →∞.
Figure 7: Savings-linked relationship lending equilibrium for different T .
Relevant parts of the isoquant maps of δS (solid black), δP (solid gray), and δRL (dashed black and solid
black). Fillings conform to δ = 0.99 (darkgray: SRL, lightgray: PRL, white: PAL).
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Appendix C. Proof of the General Model
This section shows that the model’s main results do not depend on the lower
bound that have been presumed for type L individuals’ probability of success
in the model. Let us therefore relax the assumption e−1 ≤ p < 1 and assume
0 < p < 1 instead.
First, the equilibrium in case of arm’s-length lending has to be revised. When
determining the optimal separating arm’s-length loan, Lemma I.2 proves that
tSAL ≤ tA always holds if p ≥ e−1. Thus, under the new assumption 0 < p <
1, `SALtA can now be preferred over `
SAL
tSAL
by type H individuals. The refined
preference relation is given by
`SALtA
H≺ `SALtSAL iff p ≥ e−1 ∨
(
p < e−1 ∧ δ ≥ δA,SAL := exp
[
1−p
Tpe−T
])
. (37)
This is obtained by continuing from the proof of Lemma I.2 which reduces
tSAL ≤ tA to 1 − p + T ln(δ) (1 − pe) ≥ 0. Solving for δ gives δ ≥ δA,SAL if
p < e−1. δA,SAL is strictly monotonic decreasing in p as ∂δA,SAL/∂p = δA,SAL(ep−
1)−2(1− e)/T < 0. Since limp→0 δA,SAL = e−1/T < 1 and limp→(e−1)− δA,SAL = 0,
∃δ ∈ (0, 1)(δ ≥ δA,SAL) if p < e−1.
The loan `SALtSAL is still preferred over `
PAL
0 by type H individuals if δ > δι. But
since the loan contract `SALtA is now relevant, we also need to compare this one
to a pooling arm’s-length loan that is made at t = 0. Using straightforward
calculus we obtain
`PAL0
H≺ `SALtA iff δ > δι2 := exp
[−(Tθe)−1]. (38)
We have received δPRL:lo, δPRL:hi, δA,SAL, δι, and δι2 from comparing contracts
one to another. To be able to compare all of them at once, we can define static
sets in the parameter space (θ × p) based on these deltas. This is done in
Definition I.2. These sets are labeled static because they do not depend on
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other parameters than θ and p. The subsequently following Remark I.1 provides
the rationale for the set building conditions in Definition I.2 (except for the set
Φ which is explained in Remark I.2).
Definition I.2 (Static subsets of Ψ). The set that contains the full parameter
space (θ × p) is given by
Ψ :=
{
(θ, p) | θ, p ∈ (0, 1)}. (39)
Consider the static subsets Λ,Γ,Π,X,Φ,∆,Ω,f ⊆ Ψ. Let us define
Λ :=
{
(θ, p)
∣∣∣∣ p ≤ e−1 − θ1− θ
}
, (40)
Γ :=
{
(θ, p)
∣∣∣∣ −ln[θ + (1− θ)p] ≤ θ(1− θ)(1− p)[θ + (1− θ)p]2
}
, (41)
Π :=
{
(θ, p)
∣∣∣∣ p ≤ θ(1− θ)e− θ(1− θ)(1 + θe)
}
, (42)
X :=
{
(θ, p)
∣∣∣∣ p ≤ 1− 2θ(1− θ)(1 + e)
}
, (43)
Φ :=
{
(θ, p)
∣∣∣∣ exp[ θ + (1− θ)p(1− θ)(1− pe)
]
<
1
(1− θ)(1− pe)
}
. (44)
As Ψ contains the full parameter space, it is ¬SUBSET = Ψ \ SUBSET. Let
us further define
∆ := Λ ∩ Γ, (45)
f := Λ ∪ Γ, (46)
Ω := Ψ \ f = ¬Λ ∩ ¬Γ. (47)
Remark I.1.
Γ consists of all the points (θ, p) that satisfy δPAL:lo ≤ δι.
Λ consists of all the points (θ, p) that satisfy δι, δι2 ≤ δA,SAL if p < e−1 and
δι, δι2 ≥ δA,SAL if p ≥ e−1. As the latter condition is never true, we obtain(
θ, (p ≥ e−1) ) ∈ ¬Λ. δι ≤ δA,SAL and δι2 ≤ δA,SAL give the same set building
condition of Λ.
Π consists of all the points (θ, p) that satisfy δPAL:lo ≤ δι2. As δι2 ≤ δι is always
true, the set Π is a subset of Γ.
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X consists of all the points (θ, p) that satisfy δPAL:lo ≤ δA,SAL if p < e−1, and
δPAL:lo ≥ δA,SAL if p ≥ e−1. As the latter condition is never true, we obtain(
θ, (p ≥ e−1) ) ∈ ¬X.
Ψ consists of the full parameter space of points (θ, p) and all of them satisfy
δPAL:lo, δι2, δι < δPAL:hi and δι2 ≤ δι.
Sublemma I.1. (θ, p) =
(
1
e2−e ,
e−2
e(e−1)−1
)
is the unique intersection point of the
frontier line of Λ or of Φ with the frontier lines of Γ, Π, and X, as defined in
Definition I.2.
Figure 8 illustrates the different static subsets of Ψ as defined in Definition I.2.
The set Λ (Γ,Π,X) contains all the points (θ, p) below and on the solid gray
(solid black, dashed black, dotted black) curve, the set Φ all the points left of
(but not on) the dashed gray curve. Obviously, the model under the original
assumption e−1 ≤ p < 1 is entirely covered by the set Ω. According to Fig. 8
and Sublemma I.1, Π is apparently a subset of Γ, Φ is a subset of Λ, and X is
a subset of Π ∪ Φ. Thus, Λ,Γ,Π,Φ,X ⊂ f.
Lemma I.3 proves that, if p ≥ 1/3, the separating loan `SALtSAL is preferred by
types H over the pooling loan `PALtPAL whenever the latter is relevant. Under the
assumption 0 < p < 1 we therefore need to refine this statement. And we also
need to compare the separating loan `SALtA with the same pooling loan. On the
basis on this comparison we can define two dynamic sets in Ψ, which is done
in Definition I.3. Different from the static sets in Definition I.2, the dynamic
sets change with the parameter values of δ and T . The rationale for the set
building conditions are provided in the following Remark I.2.
Definition I.3 (Dynamic subsets of Ψ). Consider the following two dynamic
subsets pi(δx, T ), γ(δx, T ) ⊆ Ψ, where δx ∈ [δPAL:lo, δPAL:hi]. Let us define
pi(δx, T ) :=
{
(θ, p)
∣∣∣∣∣ Tp− (1−p)
[
1−(1−θ)δx↑
(
T− T
(1−θ)(1−p)
)]
e ln(δx)
≤ 0
}
, (48)
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γ(δx, T ) :=
{
(θ, p)
∣∣∣∣ Tδx ↑ ( T1−p +W[TpδT/(p−1)x ln(δx)p−1 ] ln(δx)−1)
+
(1−θ)(1−p)δx↑
(
T− T
(1−θ)(1−p)
)
e ln(δx)
≤ 0
} (49)
Remark I.2.
pi(δx, T ) consists of all the points (θ, p) that satisfy UH(`SALtA ) ≤ UH(`PALtPAL) for
a given T and δ = δx ∈ [δPAL:lo, δPAL:hi]. As `PALtPAL is only the best PAL for δ = δx,
this is the relevant case to consider. With the tiebreaker rule in Definition I.1,
we get `SALtA ≺ `PALtPAL in pi(δx, T ) and `SALtA  `PALtPAL in ¬pi(δx, T ).
γ(δx, T ) consists of all the points (θ, p) that satisfy UH(`SALtSAL) ≤ UH(`PALtPAL) for a
given T and δ = δx ∈ [δPAL:lo, δPAL:hi], analogously to pi(δx, T ). Considering the
tiebreaker rule in Definition I.1, it is `SALtSAL ≺ `PALtPAL in γ(δx, T ) and `SALtSAL  `PALtPAL
in ¬γ(δx, T ).
For Φ, the set building condition is obtained by reducing UH(`SALtA ) > UH(`
PAL
tPAL
)
or UH(`SALtSAL) > UH(`
PAL
tPAL
) at δ = δA,SAL. These conditions do not contain a
restriction regarding δA,SAL, thus, the cases δA,SAL < δPAL:lo are also covered by
Φ. But as `PALtPAL is only relevant for δ ≥ δPAL:lo, Φ and ¬Φ are only meaningful
where they are intersecting the set X. This being said, it follows that points
(θ, p) ∈ Φ∩X are in ¬pi(δx, T ) and in ¬γ(δx, T ) for δx = δA,SAL. And, analogously,
points (θ, p) ∈ ¬Φ ∩ X are in pi(δx, T ) and in γ(δx, T ) for δx = δA,SAL.
Let us now analyze the dynamic sets pi(δx, T ) and γ(δx, T ) to see how they
change for different δx and T . Sublemma I.2 proofs that both sets dissolve if δx
approaches its upper bound δPAL:hi. While the dynamic set pi(δx, T ) is a subset
of the static set Π (see Lemma I.5), the dynamic set γ(δx, T ) is a subset of the
static set Γ ∪ X (see Lemma I.6).
Sublemma I.2. pi(δPAL:hi, T ), γ(δPAL:hi, T ) = ∅.
Proof. For δx = δPAL:hi, the set building conditions of pi(δx, T ) and γ(δx, T ), as
stated in Definition I.3, can be reduced to exp[pθ]
(
1 + e(p − pθ)) − exp[p +
θ](1 − θ) ≤ 0 and to p(θ − 1) + W [e1−θp(1 − θ)] ≤ 0. Both are never true
because of θ, p ∈ (0, 1). Thus, pi(δPAL:hi, T ) = γ(δPAL:hi, T ) = ∅. 
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Figure 8: Static subsets of Ψ.
Lemma I.5. pi(δx, T ) ⊆ Π.
Proof. For δx = δPAL:lo, the set building condition of pi(δx, T ) simplifies to
T
[
(e− θe)−1 − (1− p)e−1 − (1− p)θ] ≤ 0. (50)
Solving for p gives
p ≤ θ(1− θ)e− θ
(1− θ)(1 + θe) (51)
which is the set building condition of Π. Thus, pi(δPAL:lo, T ) = Π.
The first derivative of UH
(
`SALtA
)−UH(`PALtPAL) (which is the left-hand side of the
set building condition of pi(δx, T ) in Eq. (48)) with respect to δx equals
1− p+ [−(1− θ)(1− p)− T ln(δx)(θ + p− θp)]δT− T(1−θ)(1−p)x
δ ln(δx)2e
(52)
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which is always {positive, negative} if the numerator is {positive, negative}.
The numerator is strictly monotonic decreasing in δx as the first derivative of
the numerator with respect to δx is obviously always negative:
T 2 ln(δx)(θ + p− θp)2δ
T− T
(1−θ)(1−p)−1
x
(1− θ)(1− p) < 0. (53)
Solving the numerator of Eq. (52) at the lower bound of δx, that is δx = δPAL:lo,
gives 1−p which is always strictly positive since p ∈ (0, 1). Solving the numerator
at the upper bound of δx, that is δx = δPAL:hi, gives p−1−exp[θ + (1− θ)p](1−
θ)2(1 − p)2 which is always strictly positive since θ, p ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the
numerator of Eq. (52) is strictly positive for every δx, which eventually makes
Eq. (52) entirely strictly positive in the relevant range and UH(`SALtA )−UH(`PALtPAL)
strictly monotonic increasing in δx.
In conclusion, all the points (θ, p, δx, T ) that yield positive function values for
UH(`
SAL
tA
)−UH(`PALtPAL) yield even more positive values for greater δx and therefore
fail the set building condition of pi(δx, T ) even more. Negative function values of
some points (θ, p, δx, T ) turn positive with increasing δx, which causes them to
switch to ¬pi(δx, T ). Ergo, it is pi(δx,2, T ) ⊂ pi(δx,1, T ) ∀δx,1 < δx,2 (unless it is
pi(δx,1, T ) = ∅, we then have pi(δx,2, T ) = ∅). When recalling pi(δPAL:lo, T ) = Π,
we consequently obtain pi(δx, T ) ⊆ Π. 
Lemma I.6. γ(δx, T ) ⊂ Γ ∪ X.
Proof. That γ(δx, T ) ⊂ Γ∪X is true is shown by numerically simulating 25 mil-
lion uniformly i.i.d pseudo-random parameter sets (θi, pi, δi, Ti), where θi, pi ∈
R|(0 < θi, pi < 1) ∀i, δi ∈ R|
(
δPAL:lo(θi, pi, Ti) ≤ δi ≤ δPAL:hi(θi, pi, Ti)
) ∀i,
and Ti ∈ Z|(2 ≤ Ti ≤ 1000) ∀i. 2,874,987 of the simulated parameter sets
satisfy the set building condition of γ(δx, T ) and the corresponding simu-
lated points (θi, pi) ∈ γ(δi, Ti) are illustrated in Fig. 9. For every single point
(θi, pi) ∈ γ(δi, Ti) in the simulation, (θi, pi) ∈ Γ ∪ X is also true. Figure 9
evidently shows that (θi, pi) ∈ γ(δi, Ti) ∧ (θi, pi) /∈ Γ is only possible for very
small θi, pi and the corresponding points are clearly in X: we actually obtain
θ < 0.0138 and p < 0.0563 for these points from the simulation. 
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(a) Full result. (b) Detailed view.
Figure 9: Simulation results to Lemma I.6: {(θi, pi) | (θi, pi) ∈ γ(δi, Ti)}.
Now we are aware of the bounds of the dynamic sets pi(δx, T ) and γ(δx, T ). But
to be able to assess if a particular point (θ, p) is inside or outside the dynamic
sets, we need to analyze their dynamics for changes in δx in detail. For this
purpose let us establish Definition I.4.
Definition I.4. For a given point (θ, p, T ), let us define δpi(θ, p, T ) as the
globally smallest δx for which (θ, p) ∈ ¬pi(δx, T ). Equivalently, let us define
δγ(θ, p, T ) as the globally smallest δx for which (θ, p) ∈ ¬γ(δx, T ).
As δx ∈ [δPLS:lo, δPLS:hi] by definition and pi(δPAL:hi, T ), γ(δPAL:hi, T ) = ∅ (see
Sublemma I.2), there are always unique δpi(θ, p, T ) and δγ(θ, p, T ) in the sense
of Definition I.4. But there may be other (that is, greater) local minima of
δx for which (θ, p) ∈ ¬pi(δx, T ) or (θ, p) ∈ ¬γ(δx, T ). That is the case if a
particular point (θ, p) switches more than once between pi(δx, T ) and ¬pi(δx, T )
or between γ(δx, T ) and ¬γ(δx, T ) for increasing δx and given T . Figure 10
shows the dynamics of pi(δx, T ) and γ(δx, T ) for increasing δx, where the lighter
the short-dashed (solid) frontier line of the set pi(δx, T ) (γ(δx, T )), the greater
is δx. While there is no indication for additional local minima in pi(δx, T ),
Fig. 10d shows that for some points (θ, p) in the parameter space there is
clearly multiple switching between γ(δx, T ) and ¬γ(δx, T ) for increasing δx.
This issue is addressed by the finality property formulated in Lemma I.7. It
is shown that there are indeed no local minima of δx different from δpi(θ, p, T )
for which (θ, p) ∈ ¬pi(δx, T ). And points of multiple switching between γ(δx, T )
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(b) Detailed pi(δx, T ).
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Θ
p
(c) γ(δx, T ).
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
Θ
p
(d) Detailed γ(δx, T ).
Figure 10: Dynamics of pi(δx, T ) and γ(δx, T ) for increasing δx.
and ¬γ(δx, T ) for increasing δx are solely located in a small fraction of the set
X \ Π. To subsume, the finality property in Lemma I.7 states that if a point
(θ, p) is in ¬pi(δx, T ) for a given δx = δj, it is also in ¬pi(δx, T ) for any δx ≥ δj.
And if a point (θ, p) is in ¬γ(δx, T ) for a given δx = δj, it is also in ¬γ(δx, T )
for any δx ≥ δj if (θ, p) /∈ X \ Π.
Lemma I.7 (Finality property).
1. (θ, p) ∈ ¬pi(δx, T ) ∀δx ≥ δpi(θ, p, T );
2. (θ, p) ∈ ¬γ(δx, T ) ∀δx ≥ δγ(θ, p, T ) if (θ, p) /∈ X \ Π.
Proof.
1. Lemma I.5 states that pi(δx, T ) ⊆ Π. Thus, it is (θ, p) ∈ ¬pi(δx, T ) ∀δx if
(θ, p) ∈ ¬Π. For the case of (θ, p) ∈ Π, the proof of Lemma I.5 already
contains the proof that if (θ, p) is in ¬pi(δx, T ) for some δx = δj, it is also
in ¬pi(δx, T ) for every δx ≥ δj. This is true as the left-hand side of the
set building condition of pi(δx, T ) is strictly monotonic increasing in δx.
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Ergo, there are no local minima of δx different from δpi(θ, p, T ) for which
(θ, p) ∈ ¬pi(δx, T ).
2. The sufficient condition for switching back to ¬γ(δx, T ) for increasing δx
after once being in γ(δx, T ) is that points (θ, p) that lie on the frontier line
of γ(δx, T ) for given T (that is, the set building condition is satisfied with
equality) show a negative slope of UH(`SALtSAL)− UH(`PALtPAL) in δx.
Let us first narrow down the set of points that can show multiple switching
by determining the points that can possess a negative slope in δx at all.
Of the 2,874,987 simulated parameter sets (θi, pi, δi, Ti) in Lemma I.6 that
satisfy the set building condition of γ(δx, T ), 60,510 parameter sets show
a negative slope of UH(`SALtSAL) − UH(`PALtPAL) in δx. Those parameter sets, as
illustrated in Fig. 11a, are characterized by θ < 0.132 and p < 0.062 in the
simulation and, thus, we can focus on a smaller range in the further analysis.
It actually does not matter if a point oscillates in the negative or positive
range for increasing δx, but a negative slope of points that lie on the frontier
line of γ(δx, T ) is crucial for multiple switching. Therefore, I employ a numer-
ical simulation of uniformly i.i.d. pseudo-random parameter sets (θi, pi, Ti),
where θi ∈ (0, 0.15) ∀i, pi ∈ (0, 0.1) ∀i, and Ti ∈ [2, 1000] ∩ Z ∀i.For every
parameter set (θi, pi, Ti) I apply Newton-Raphson method to determine
a real-numbered δi ∈
[
δPAL:lo(θi, pi, Ti), δPAL:hi(θi, pi, Ti)
]
—if existent—that
approximates UH(`SALtSAL) − UH(`PALtPSL) = 0 with accuracy 10−12. To avoid
systematic convergence problems or results that are induced by a system-
atic starting point choice, I adopt a random starting point in the interval(
δPAL:lo(θi, pi, Ti), δPAL:hi(θi, pi, Ti)
)
for the Newton-Raphson method.
This procedure is operated until we receive 1,000,000 simulated points (θi, pi)
that lie on the frontier line of γ(δi, Ti) (at least approximately with accuracy
10−12). 86,068 of the simulated points additionally possess a negative slope
of UH(`SALtSAL)− UH(`PALtPAL) in δx. Figure 11b illustrates these points and the
fact that every single one of them is by far in the set X\Π (which is a proper
subset of Φ∩X) and therefore clearly not in Γ \ (∆ \Π). Multiple switching
between γ(δx, T ) and ¬γ(δx, T ) for increasing δx can therefore only occur in
a little fraction of the set X \ Π. Thus, if a point (θ, p) is not in X \ Π, it is
in ¬γ(δx, T ) for every δx ≥ δγ(θ, p, T ). 
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(a) Points in γ(δx, T ) with negative slope. (b) Points in γ(δx, T ) of multiple
switching.
Figure 11: Simulation results to Lemma I.7.
We are now able to entirely deduce the choice pattern of type H individuals
(see Lemma I.8) and, based on that, to describe the equilibrium in a market of
arm’s-length lending.
Lemma I.8. Under informational asymmetries and without relationship lend-
ing, type H individuals choose the following loan:
in Ω :
`
PAL
0 if δ ≤ δι,
`SALtSAL if δι < δ,
(54)
in Λ \ Π :

`PAL0 if δ ≤ δι2,
`SALtA if δι2 < δ < δA,SAL,
`SALtSAL if δA,SAL ≤ δ,
(55)
in Γ \ Φ :

`PAL0 if δ ≤ δPAL:lo,
`PALtPAL if δPAL:lo < δ < δγ(θ, p, T ),
`SALtSAL if δγ(θ, p, T ) ≤ δ.
(56)
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in Π ∩ Φ :

`PAL0 if δ ≤ δPAL:lo,
`PALtPAL if δPAL:lo < δ < δpi(θ, p, T ),
`SALtA if δpi(θ, p, T ) ≤ δ < δA,SAL,
`SALtSAL if δA,SAL ≤ δ.
(57)
Proof. The elements of Ω are by definition and by Sublemma I.1 in ¬Γ ∩ ¬Λ ∩
¬Π ∩ ¬X. Thus, we obtain from Remark I.1 that in Ω it is δι2 ≤ δι < δPAL:lo <
δA,SAL in case of p ≥ e−1, and δA,SAL < δι2 ≤ δι < δPAL:lo in case of p < e−1.
`SALtSAL  `SALtA is always true in case of p ≥ e−1. Here, it is also true for p < e−1
because of δA,SAL < δι2: the loan `SALtA can never be better than a PAL for
types H if δ ≤ δι2 but I have shown that `SALtSAL  `SALtA if δ ≥ δA,SAL. Since
γ(δx, T ) ⊂ (Γ ∪ X) * Ω, according to Lemma I.6, from Remark I.2 follows
that `SALtSAL  `PALtPAL is always true in Ω whenever `PALtPAL is the best PAL, that is,
if δ > δPAL:lo. Hence, `PAL0 is the best loan contract for types H if δ ≤ δι, and
`SALtSAL is the best choice if δ > δι.
Let us subdivide the set Λ \Π into three subsets A := Λ \X, B := (Λ∩X) \∆,
and C := ∆ \ Π to gather the solution. In A it is δι2 ≤ δι ≤ δA,SAL < δPAL:lo,
according to Remark I.1. When imagining to increase δ beginning from the lower
bound, we see that `PAL0 is the most preferred loan of types H until δ passes
δι2. If δι2 < δA,SAL, `SALtA is type H individuals’ first choice for δι2 < δ < δA,SAL.
When δ reaches δA,SAL we obtain `SALtSAL  `SALtA , and from δι < δPAL:lo follows
`SALtSAL  `PAL0 . In the special case δι2 = δι = δA,SAL, however, `SALtA is never
preferred and `SALtSAL directly replaces `
PAL
0 as the first choice when δ passes
δι2 = δι = δA,SAL. Further, from Lemma I.6 follows that A ⊂ ¬γ(δx, T ) since
A ⊂ ¬Π, and we therefore obtain from Remark I.2 that `SALtSAL  `PALtPAL for
δ > δPAL:lo.
In B it is δι2 ≤ δι < δPAL:lo ≤ δA,SAL and in C we obtain δι2 < δPAL:lo ≤
δι < δA,SAL by Remark I.1 and Sublemma I.1.29 Since δι2 < δPAL:lo ≤ δA,SAL
29The strict inequality δι < δA,SAL in C is true since the frontier line of Λ is not contained in
the set (see Sublemma I.1).
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and δι < δA,SAL is true in both subsets, it follows that `SALtA  `SALtSAL , `PAL0 for
δι2 < δ < δA,SAL and that `SALtSAL  `SALtA , `PAL0 for δ ≥ δA,SAL. As B, C ⊂ ¬Π
and pi(δx, T ) ⊆ Π (see Lemma I.5), we get B, C ⊂ ¬pi(δx, T ). Thus, from
Remark I.2 follows that `SALtA  `PALtPAL for δ > δPAL:lo. Since `SALtSAL  `SALtA if
δ ≥ δA,SAL and δPAL:lo ≤ δA,SAL is true in both B and C, we consequentially
receive `SALtSAL  `SALtA  `PALtPAL for δ ≥ δA,SAL.
As the set Γ \∆ is a proper subset of ¬Λ and also of Γ, it is characterized by
δA,SAL < δι2 ≤ δι and δPAL:lo ≤ δι (see Remark I.1). From the former inequality
follows that `SALtA is never preferred by types H when feasible. In combination
with the latter inequation we see that a PAL is the first choice of types H
unless `SALtSAL  `PALtPAL is true. Since Γ \∆ ⊂ Γ \ (∆ \Π), from the finality property
in Lemma I.7 follows that `SALtSAL  `PALtPAL is true for every δ ≥ δγ(θ, p, T ), where
δγ(θ, p, T ) > δι ≥ δPAL:lo.30
∆ \ Φ is a proper subset of Λ ∩ Γ ∩ Π ∩ X and—as the only one of the subsets
as stated in Lemma I.8—contains the general intersection point of the static
subsets’ frontier lines, as specified in Sublemma I.1. Thus, Remark I.1 gives
the order δPAL:lo ≤ δι2 ≤ δι ≤ δA,SAL. As ∆ \ Φ ⊂ ¬Φ ∩ X, Remark I.2
states that ∆ \ Φ ⊂ pi(θ, p, T ) and ∆ \ Φ ⊂ γ(θ, p, T ) for δ = δA,SAL. From
Lemma I.7 follows that the finality property is unconditionally valid in ∆ \ Φ.
Therefore, `SALtA , `
SAL
tSAL
≺ `PALtPAL is not only true for δ = δA,SAL but also for
δPAL:lo ≤ δ ≤ δA,SAL. I have shown that `SALtSAL  `SALtA for δ ≥ δA,SAL, and from
the finality property follows that `SALtSAL  `PALtPAL if δ ≥ δγ(θ, p, T ), where obviously
δγ(θ, p, T ) > δA,SAL. For the general intersection point of the static subsets’
frontier lines, as specified in Sublemma I.1, it is δ = δPAL:lo = δι2 = δι = δA,SAL,
and, therefore, the equilibrium choice of type H obviously reduces to `PAL0 if
δ ≤ δ and to `SALtSAL otherwise. Thus, we finally obtain the same result for set
∆ \ Φ as for set Γ \∆, which in union produce the set Γ \ Φ.
30δι = δPAL:lo is only true for points on the frontier line of Γ. As δγ(θ, p, T ) shares the frontier
line with Γ in the subset Γ \∆, δ ≤ δPAL:lo can never satisfy ¬γ(δx, T ) for these points
according to Lemma I.6. In case of δι > δPAL:lo, an SAL can only be better than a PAL if
δ > δι.
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The set Π∩Φ differs in two aspects from the previously analyzed set ∆\Φ. First,
it does not contain the general intersection point specified in Sublemma I.1.
Thus, we obtain the order δPAL:lo ≤ δι2 ≤ δι < δA,SAL, according to Remark I.1.
Second, Π ∩ Φ is in Φ ∩X. Hence, we have ∆ \ Φ ⊂ ¬pi(θ, p, T ) and ∆ \ Φ ⊂
¬γ(θ, p, T ) at δ = δA,SAL, according to Remark I.2. Since Π ∩ Φ ⊂ Γ \ (∆ \ Π),
the finality property in Lemma I.7 is unconditionally valid in Π ∩Φ. Therefore,
`SALtA  `PALtPAL is true for δ ≥ δpi(θ, p, T ), where obviously δpi(θ, p, T ) ≤ δA,SAL. I
have shown that `SALtSAL  `SALtA if δ ≥ δA,SAL and, thus, it is also `SALtSAL  `PALtPAL
in case of δ ≥ δA,SAL because of δpi(θ, p, T ) < δA,SAL, and the finality property
holds. 
If a PAL is preferred by types H (which cases are derived in Lemma I.8),
type L individuals also prefer it if t < tα as, in that case, it is also the utility
maximizing contract for types L according to Lemma I.1. As shown before,
types H never choose a PAL with t ≥ tα because, in that case, there is always
a feasible SAL that provides greater utility. If an SAL is chosen by types H,
types L choose their best alternative which is `LSL0 , as follows from Lemma I.1.
Type L individuals can at best receive the type-adequate selective loan terms
since an SAL is perfectly separating and, thus, type L individuals’ choice of a
different loan is perfectly type-revealing.
Now that we have derived the equilibrium in a market of arm’s-length lending
for 0 < p < 1, we need to take savings-linked relationship lending into account
to finally arrive at the relationship lending equilibrium. Since the arm’s-length
lending equilibrium now additionally incorporates the loan contracts `SALtA and
`PALtPAL , we owe the comparison of those two contracts with the best savings-linked
relationship loan contracts.
The comparison of relationship lending with the separating arm’s-length loan
`SALtA can be reduced to a few cases. From Lemma I.8 follows that `
SAL
tA
can only
be an equilibrium contract for a defined range of δ in the subsets Λ \ Π and
Π ∩ Φ of the parameter space (θ × p), which in conjunction produce the set
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Λ\(∆\Φ). Lemma I.9 shows that the separating arm’s-length loan contract `SALtA
is dominated by the optimal separating relationship loan contract whenever the
former is relevant. Since I have shown before by Lemma I.4 that the separating
arm’s-length loan `SALtSAL is also dominated by the best separating relationship
loan, we can finally conclude that there is always a separating relationship loan
that is preferred over a separating arm’s-length loan by type H individuals.
Lemma I.9. `SRLtSRL
H `SALtA if δ ∈
(
min [δι2, δPAL:lo] , δA,SAL
)
and (θ, p) ∈ Λ \
(∆ \ Φ).
Proof. I apply a numerical simulation of 5 million uniformly i.i.d. pseudo-
random parameter sets (θi, pi, δi, Ti), where θi, pi ∈ Λ\(∆\Φ) ∀i, Ti ∈ [2, 1000]∩
Z ∀i, and δi ∈
(
min{δι2(θi, Ti), δPAL:lo(θi, pi, Ti)}, δA,SAL(pi, Ti)
) ∀i. The interval
endpoints of δi are due to the relevant values of δ for which `SALtA can be an
equilibrium contract, as specified in Lemma I.8. I employ the secant method with
initial starting values 0 and Ti to approximate a real-numbered tSC,i ∈ (0, Ti)
for every parameter set i with minimum precision of 1× 10−9.31 Every single
simulated parameter set i satisfies UH(`SRLtSRL) > UH(`
SAL
tA
). 
Lemma I.10. `PRLt
H `PALt ∀t ∈ (0, T ).
Proof. The difference of the particular general utilities, UPCLCH − UPALH , easily
simplifies to
δtθ(1− θ)(1− p)(1− pt)(T − t)
θ + pt(1− θ) , (58)
which is obviously always strictly positive if 0 < t < T , and zero if t = 0. Hence,
for each t ∈ (0, T ), it is UPCLCH (t) > UPALH (t) and thus `PCLCt  `PALt is true for
type H individuals. 
From Lemma I.10 follows that there is always a pooling relationship loan that
types H prefer over a pooling arm’s-length loan at t > 0. Thus, `PAL0 is the only
PAL that can be preferred by types H over the best relationship loan contract
31The average approximation accuracy appears to be about 1× 10−15 in my simulation.
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and is therefore the only non-relationship loan contract that is relevant in the
model market. Hence, the remaining loans to consider in the model market
with relationship lending and asymmetric information reduce to `PAL0 , `SRLtSRL ,
and `PRLtPRL . These are the same contracts that remained in equilibrium under
the assumption e−1 ≤ p < 1, and the same final equilibrium conditions emerge.
Q.E.D.
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Part II
Credit Information Sharing and
Borrower Discipline Revisited
Abstract
Credit information sharing between lenders can have a disciplinary effect
on borrowers because defaulting with one lender ruins the reputation with
every other lender (Vercammen, 1995; Padilla and Pagano, 2000). This
reputation effect, however, diminishes and finally disappears the more
comprehensive credit registries become. I show in a multi-period model
of repeated lending that credit information sharing can induce borrower
discipline beyond “passive” reputation effects if banks apply classical dis-
ciplining, that is, if failure to pay inevitably provokes consequences. I find
that such disciplining can Pareto improve the efficiency of the financing
market and reduce defaults by overcoming market failure and mitigating
underinvestment in projects and in effort, even for comprehensive and
unrestricted credit information sharing. I further show that disciplining
borrowers by pro rata rationing credit after default is more promising
than tightening credit rates. Hence, my model provides a rare case of
efficient equilibrium credit rationing: disciplining by credit rationing
enhances the efficiency of the market while constituting aggregate equilib-
rium credit rationing in the sense of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Contrary
to the previous literature that suggests to restrict and randomize credit
reporting in order to prevent diminishing reputation effects, the policy
implications following from my work are, first, to rather restrict access to
credit registries than their content and, second, to enhance transparency
of information sharing.
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1 Introduction
Asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers about the quality of
borrowers is uncontroversially considered to be the major cause of inefficiencies
and failures of the credit market. To reduce these problems, lenders can pro-
duce information about borrowers’ quality by monitoring or screening. As an
alternative to producing information about every borrower themselves, lenders
can share information about borrowers with other lenders. Credit information
sharing among banks is actually a widespread practice in most countries by
using publicly regulated or private credit registries (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002;
Djankov et al., 2007). Theoretical research identified three basic effects and
explanations of such information sharing. First, credit information sharing
allows lenders to offer more accurate loan terms and thereby reduces adverse
selection problems (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993). Second, sharing information
about borrowers prevents banks from extracting rents from borrowers, which
entails more competitive credit terms and increases borrowers’ incentives to
perform (Padilla and Pagano, 1997). Third, information sharing can discipline
borrowers and reduce moral hazard (Vercammen, 1995; Padilla and Pagano,
2000). My work directly relates to the third approach.
The works of Vercammen (1995) and Padilla and Pagano (2000) are based on
reputation effects of information sharing which are in line with the definition
of Diamond (1989): “Reputation effects on decisions arise when an agent
adjusts his or her behavior to influence data others use in learning about
him”. Hence, defaulting borrowers may lose their reputation with every lender
and not just the current one if lenders share credit information. This can
induce incentives to perform. But, by this definition, the reputation effects
should decline if there is less to learn about agents. That is exactly what
Vercammen (1995) and Padilla and Pagano (2000) find in their theoretical work
and Brown and Zehnder (2007) confirm by studying a laboratory credit market:
the more comprehensive the credit registry, the weaker the reputation effects
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of information sharing. The disciplinary reputation effects can be maintained
in the two-period model framework of Padilla and Pagano (2000) if lenders
solely share default information instead of sharing comprehensive information
about borrowers’ qualities. But this result does not persist in a multi-period
setting. When considering many periods, the informational difference between
sharing default information and sharing full quality information diminishes over
time and finally disappears as the credit reporting system matures and thereby
becomes more comprehensive, like in Vercammen (1995) and, in a comparable
setting, in Holmström (1982).32 To solve the problem of diminishing reputation
effects, Vercammen (1995) suggests to restrict credit information sharing by,
for instance, partially preventing access to credit histories. Padilla and Pagano
(2000) suggest a policy to randomize credit information sharing in order to
control the informativeness of the registries.33
Instead of building on “passive” reputation effects that are due to credit infor-
mation sharing and trying to fix their diminishing nature for maturing credit
registries by artificially reducing their informativeness, I suggest a different
approach to discipline borrowers on the basis of credit information sharing:
classical disciplining. Disciplining generally requires that undesirable behav-
ior inevitably provokes unfavorable consequences. If behavior is not directly
observable, the undesirable outcome that is due to the undesirable behavior
can be used as proxy. The outcome that is undesirable for creditors in lending
relationships is borrowers’ failure to pay.
Reputation effects do not qualify as classical disciplining, as illustrated in the
following. The only direct and inevitable consequence of a borrower’s default in
32Diamond (1989), in contrast, finds that reputation effects strengthen with time. This result
is due to a different modeling. Default is modeled to be a perfectly revealing signal of
high-risk project choice. With time, pools of high-risk and low-risk borrowers get more
refined and the differences in credit terms between these pools widen. Thus, costs of
reputation (that is, costs of being assigned to the high-risk pool) increase.
33Actually, Padilla and Pagano (2000) suggest to randomly share combinations of plain
default information and information about borrowers’ quality. But, again, this approach
does not seem promising in a multi-period context that takes maturing credit reporting
systems into account, as follows from the previous argumentation.
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Vercammen (1995) and in Padilla and Pagano (2000) is that the information
that the borrower defaulted is shared. This direct consequence of default is not
unfavorable for a borrower per se but it can constitute unfavorable indirect
consequences: when banks use the default information shared in their assessment
of the borrower’s quality (or reputation), future credit terms offered to that
borrower can be unfavorably affected. But, as discussed above, the existence and
the extent of these indirect consequences of default heavily depend on and vary
with the particular information set that lenders possess about the particular
borrower. A new piece of default information has only little or no effect on
lenders’ assessment of the borrower’s quality and therefore does not affect her
reputation if lenders possess extensive or even comprehensive information about
her. My work sets in at this point where reputation effects break down and fail
to induce borrower discipline.
I develop a multi-period model of repeated bank lending to entrepreneurs in
a competitive financing market with a comprehensive credit registry in place.
While comprehensive information sharing solves the problems of adverse selec-
tion, the problems of moral hazard (related to entrepreneurs’ non-contractible
effort choice that is private information) remain present. To discipline borrowers
and induce incentives to perform, the information shared in the registry can be
used by banks to establish direct unfavorable consequences in the next financing
after a borrower’s default. While consequences of default can be implemented in
different ways, I argue that punishing borrowers that fail to repay a credit with
pro rata credit rationing is a promising approach.34 I show that disciplining by
tightening the credit rate after a default has serious limitations in comparison
to disciplining by credit rationing.35 First, punishing defaulters in terms of a
34In related work, Allen (1983) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) find total exclusion from the
credit market to be an effective disciplinary device.
35Increasing collateral requirements would be another way to implement disciplining but is
not studied in this paper. Though, empirical research finds collateral to be increasing with
credit information sharing (Doblas-Madrid and Minetti, 2013), which could be explained
by disciplining. Another explanation in terms of reducing adverse selection problems is
given by Karapetyan and Stacescu (2014).
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higher credit rate reduces their incentives to perform after a default and they
become more likely to default again, which is not the case for disciplining by
credit rationing. Second, disciplining by credit rate tightening breaks down in
more cases than disciplining by credit rationing since it can lead to punishment
excesses where every punishment requires an even greater next punishment.
Hence, my model adds a novel explanation for the empirical observation that
banks rather apply changes to the availability of credit than to the price of
credit when their costs of lending shift (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).
The model shows that, in spite of comprehensive and unrestricted credit reg-
istries, classical disciplining on the basis of credit information sharing is feasible
and can increase borrowers’ incentives to perform. In particular disciplining
by credit rationing can Pareto improve the efficiency of the financing market
and reduce default probabilities. It can overcome market failure and mitigate
underinvestment in projects and in effort. Hence, my work demonstrates that
credit information sharing can induce borrower discipline beyond “passive” repu-
tation effects by actively using the information shared. For classical disciplining,
contrary to reputation effects, it is in general not important how detailed the
information shared is, as long as the relevant information for disciplining is
included.
The use of disciplining can, of course, not lead to a perfectly efficient allocation.
The positive effects of disciplining by credit rationing are achieved at the
price of equilibrium credit rationing in the sense of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
But since the efficiency enhancement of the market is intrinsically tied to
and induced by credit rationing, the equilibrium credit rationing occurring in
my model is effcient and not a case for government intervention (as also in
de Mesa and Webb, 1992), contrary to a substantial previous literature on
credit rationing (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Keeton, 1979; Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981, 1983; Williamson, 1986). My model therefore provides a rare case of
efficient equilibrium credit rationing.
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My work also gives a novel explanation why lenders do not only share default
information but also contract-specific information like credit volumes and credit
rates. Bennardo et al. (2015) provide an understanding why banks share such
data and how this affects credit market performance. They show that the
possibility of multi-bank lending can produce incentives to overborrow which
can be mitigated by sharing contract-specific information about past debts. My
model offers a different and very direct reason to share contract-specific data
that does not rely on the effects of multi-bank lending: contract-specific data
show to be required to set up and maintain disciplining effectively.
The remainder of this part is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the
basic model featuring comprehensive credit information sharing. I solve the
stage game before I generally analyze the repeated game for a market without
and with disciplining. Section 3 analyzes disciplining by credit rationing and
evaluates its efficiency. Section 4 shows the limitations of disciplining by credit
rate tightening, before Section 5 discusses policy implications for credit reporting
systems. I conclude in Section 6.
2 The Basic Model
Consider many externally heterogeneous and internally homogeneous groups
of risk-neutral entrepreneurs in the market. Entrepreneurs of the same group
j share the identical entrepreneurial quality, entrepreneurs of different groups
differ in quality. Every entrepreneur of group j can operate a risky one-period
project every period. Entrepreneurs are assumed to have no endowment and to
entirely and immediately consume all the residual income they receive. Thus,
entrepreneurs’ projects are completely debt-financed. The financing market be
competitive and features established credit information sharing between lenders.
The credit registry provides data about entrepreneurs’ qualities, their credit
histories, and details about past contracts (like credit volumes and credit rates).
The credit reporting system therefore constitutes a fully comprehensive credit
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registry that perfectly reveals every borrower’s quality to every lender. The fact
of information sharing between lenders and the informativeness of the credit
registry are common knowledge. I regard as given that information is collected
and shared truthfully in the credit registry without explicitly modeling and
exploring banks’ incentives to do so.
Although the quality of every entrepreneur of the same group j is identical,
they can still differ in their credit history. That means that the track record of
successes and defaults is individual even for entrepreneurs of the same quality
group since project operation is assumed to be stochastic and defaults are not
perfectly correlated. Entrepreneurs are therefore fully characterized by their
quality group j and their credit history h. Let di ∈ {s, f, 0} label if there is a
success (s), a failure (f), or no project operation (0) in period i. Then a credit
history h after period t is defined as the ordered sequence h = 〈di〉i≤t. Let the
history h+ be a direct successor of history h. That means, if h is a history
after period t, it is h+ = h‖dt+1, where ‖ denotes sequence concatenation.
Because of the binomial character of the success probability distribution, we
have h+ ∈ {hs, hf , h0}, where history hs marks the direct successor of history h
that is characterized by success following on history h, history hf analogously
marks the direct successor of history h that is characterized by failure in
the project following on history h, and h0 marks that there is no project
operation after history h. Given a history h after period t, let us generally write
hdt+1dt+2...dt+m = h‖dt+1‖dt+2‖ . . . ‖dt+m to specify the m next project outcomes
following on history h. Further, let the history h→ be an unspecified possible
successor of history h.
Comprehensive credit registries allow banks to offer different loan terms to differ-
ent quality groups of entrepreneurs, but they generally also allow lenders to base
credit terms on individual credit histories. After every history h, risk-neutral
lenders can offer one-period standard loan contracts θj(h) =
(
λj(h), rj(h)
)
of
volume λj(h) ≥ 0 and with credit rate rj(h) ≥ 0 to entrepreneurs of group j.
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The entrepreneurial quality of entrepreneurs in the same group j is determined
by pij := {Rj, ej(p), p¯j}. An entrepreneur’s project returns λj(h)Rj > λj(h)
with probability pj(h) and it returns 0 otherwise for an investment of λj(h)
monetary units after history h. Entrepreneurs choose the success probability
pj(h) ∈ [0, p¯j] for every project independently,36 where the maximum success
probability, p¯j , is characterized by 0 < p¯j < 1. Entrepreneurs face costs of effort
of λj(h) ej[pj(h)] for an investment of λj(h) monetary units. About the effort
function I assume e′j(p), e′′j (p) > 0 ∀p > 0, and ej(0) = e′j(0) = 0. Let us further
assume that e′j(p¯j) > Rj − 1/p¯j to obtain an interior solution of the stage game.
While the success probability pj(h) is private information of an entrepreneur
and not contractible, the actual return of the project is observable, verifiable,
and contractible by the current lender. In this way I assume that legal forces
ensure that entrepreneurs repay the loan whenever they can. Standardizing
the discount factor to one, an entrepreneur’s expected utility of a one-period
investment project that is operated after history h with credit terms θj(h) is
given by
Uj[θj(h), pj(h)] = λj(h)
[
pj(h)
(
Rj − 1− rj(h)
)− ej[pj(h)]]. (59)
Since preferences of entrepreneurs are assumed to be monotonic in the credit
volume, we require an upper limit for financing. Let therefore every single project
be scalable up to an investment of one monetary unit, that is, λj(h) ≤ 1 ∀h, j.
Borrowers of different quality exist in the model market but lenders can perfectly
distinguish between different quality types because of comprehensive credit
registries. So lenders can address different credit terms to different quality groups
j of entrepreneurs. Information sharing has therefore resolved the problem of
adverse selection (see Pagano and Jappelli, 1993) but moral hazard problems
remain present in the strategic interaction between lenders and borrowers.
36Adding a stochastic relationship between effort choice and probability of success makes the
analysis much more complex but does not change the main results.
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Figure 12: Extensive form representation of the model’s stage game between bank
B and entrepreneur E of quality group j.
We consider sequential interaction of banks and entrepreneurs in every period.
Figure 12 illustrates the model’s stage game in extensive form representation.
First, banks can offer standard loan contracts with terms θj(h) to entrepreneurs
of quality group j after a history h; an empty contract set, θj(h) = ∅, represents
that a bank does not provide a loan contract to entrepreneurs of group j after
history h. Then entrepreneurs either reject the loan and do not operate the
project, or they accept a loan contract and choose the success probability,
pj(h), for their current project operation before nature decides about success or
failure of the project. In contrast to Vercammen (1995) and Padilla and Pagano
(2000), entrepreneurs do not behave as price takers choosing their effort level
along the supply curve of the bank. This structural difference ensures that my
model features a more severe problem of moral hazard that disciplining needs
to resolve.
The financing market is assumed to be competitive. Banks and entrepreneurs
possess a general preference to be in business. Thus, banks prefer zero-profit
lending over no lending, and entrepreneurs prefer to operate a project that
yields zero utility over gaining zero utility from omitting the project (for which
I account in Fig. 12 by subtracting a marginal amount  from the payoff in
case of non-financing).
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2.1 Stage Game Analysis
In the one-period stage game, future consequences of default can naturally
not be implemented and disciplining is not possible. The result of the stage
game analysis is therefore the market solution without disciplining effects. Since
credit histories are not relevant in the stage game, entrepreneurs are sufficiently
characterized by their quality pij.
A bank’s expected repayment of the loan contract θj = (λj, rj) made to an
entrepreneur of quality group j in the stage game is pjλj(1 + rj). Banks’ break-
even loan rate is therefore given by rB(pj) := 1/pj − 1, where 1/p¯j − 1 ≤ rB ≤
Rj − 1. Or, vice versa, if a bank offers the credit rate rj to an entrepreneur of
group j, the bank requires the entrepreneur to choose the success probability
pj = pB(rj) := 1/(1 + rj) to break even. The bounds for the break-even rate
unfold as follows. As investment projects never return more than λjRj , the total
repayment of a loan, λj (1 + rj), can never exceed λjRj . This induces the upper
bound, Rj − 1, for the break-even loan rate and, correspondingly, the lowest
possible success probability for which financing can be possible to be R−1j . The
break-even rate’s lower bound corresponds to the maximum success probability,
p¯j, that entrepreneurs can choose for project operation. The solution space for
financing equilibria is therefore given by
Ωj := ω
p
j × ωrj , (60)
where ωpj :=
{
pj
∣∣ R−1j ≤ pj ≤ p¯j} ,
ωrj := {rj | 1/p¯j − 1 ≤ rj ≤ Rj − 1} .
(61)
Subsequent to banks’ loan contract offers, entrepreneurs enter a contract and
choose the success probability of their project with their effort choice. Given
the loan contract (λj, rj), an entrepreneur’s optimal choice of pj follows from
the first-order condition ∂Uj(λj, rj)/∂pj = 0.37 We obtain the best response
37The second-order condition is always satisfied in case of financing since we have ∂2Uj/∂p2j ≡
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function, rˆ0j , of entrepreneur j that describes optimal combinations of the credit
rate and the success probability choice in the stage game,
rˆ0j := Rj − 1− e′j(pj). (62)
Due to the characteristics of the effort function ej(p), there is a unique optimal
pj for every loan rate offered. Entrepreneurs’ optimal choice is, as well as banks’
break-even constraint, obviously independent from the credit volume λj. But
if project operation has a positive expected utility for entrepreneurs, greater
credit volume provides greater utility. Hence, the maximum credit volume
λj = 1 is offered in the competitive stage game if a loan is offered at all.
A financing Nash equilibrium of the stage game generally requires that the best
response functions of banks and entrepreneurs agree in the solution space Ωj .38
Competition in the financing market entails that the best response of a bank
to the strategy pj of an entrepreneur is the break-even loan rate rB(pj). Thus,
a Nash equilibrium of the stage game requires rˆ0j = rB in the solution space Ωj ,
which forms the equilibrium condition
e′j(pj) = Rj − 1/pj. (63)
Depending on entrepreneurs’ quality pij, Eq. (63) has no, one, or two solutions
in the space Ωj, as stated and shown by Lemma II.1.
Lemma II.1. Dependent on an entrepreneur’s quality pij, the best response
functions do either not intersect, or intersect tangentially exactly once, or
intersect transversely exactly twice in the solution space Ωj.
Proof. rB is a monotonic decreasing strictly convex function in pj, while rˆ0j
is a monotonic decreasing strictly concave function in pj, since ∂rB/∂pj < 0,
−λj e′′j (pj) < 0.
38Banks would not provide financing if rˆ0j < rB since they would face losses. If rˆ0j > rB,
banks would earn strictly positive profits from financing and other banks would be able to
offer more attractive loan terms to win borrowers over.
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∂rB/∂
2pj > 0, and ∂rˆ0j/∂pj, ∂rˆ0j/∂2pj < 0. For the smallest pj ∈ ωpj , which
is given by R−1j , we obtain rB(R
−1
j ) = Rj − 1 > rˆj(R−1j ) = Rj − 1 − e′j(pj)
because of e′j(p) > 0. For the greatest pj ∈ ωpj , which is given by p¯j, we have
rB(p¯j) > rˆ
0
j (p¯j) if e′j(p¯j) > Rj − 1/p¯j which is true by assumption. Thus,
depending on entrepreneurs’ quality pij, rB = rˆ0j has either no, one, or two
solutions in the solution space Ωj . If there is only one solution, it necessarily is
the point of tangency of the best response functions. 
With Definition II.1 I aggregate entrepreneurs of quality groups j to generic
groups Gι, depending on the number of intersections, ι, that their best response
functions and banks’ best response function show in the solution space according
to Lemma II.1. These definitions are sufficient and complete under the global
assumptions of the model, as follows from Lemma II.1.
Definition II.1 (Generic Groups).
G∅ := {j | Ωj = ∅} , (64)
G0 :=
{
j
∣∣ Ωj 6= ∅ ∧ ∀pj ∈ ωpj : e′j(pj) > Rj − 1/pj} , (65)
G1 :=
{
j
∣∣ j /∈ G∅ ∪G0 ∧ @pj ∈ ωpj : e′j(pj) < Rj − 1/pj} , (66)
G2 :=
{
j
∣∣ ∃pj ∈ ωpj : e′j(pj) < Rj − 1/pj} . (67)
Figure 13 illustrates the best response functions and the financing Nash equi-
libria for entrepreneurs of different generic groups. Entrepreneurs of a group
j ∈ G∅ are characterized by p¯j < R−1j , that is, by an empty solution space,
Ωj, for financing equilibria. Thus, there is no feasible combination of credit
rate and success probability for which financing could be possible at all and
an illustration is pointless. For entrepreneurs of generic group G0 there is no
solution to Eq. (63) in the non-empty solution space Ωj, that is, the best
response functions do not intersect. Moral hazard prevents banks to break even
when offering financing in this case. For entrepreneurs of a group j ∈ G1 there
is exactly one solution to rˆ0j = rB in Ωj, which is the best response functions’
point of tangency (pτj , rτj ), where pτj satisfies ∂rˆ0j/∂pj = ∂rB/∂pj which reduces
to e′′j (pj) = 1/p2j . This forms the unique financing Nash equilibrium of the stage
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(a) j ∈ G0.
(b) j ∈ G1.
(c) j ∈ G2.
Figure 13: Best response functions and financing equilibria in the stage game for
entrepreneurs of different generic groups G.
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game for j ∈ G1. For entrepreneurs of generic group G2 there are exactly two
intersection points of the best response functions in Ωj , which are (p2,1j , r
2,1
j ) and
(p2,2j , r
2,2
j ), where r
2,1
j > r
2,2
j and p
2,1
j < p
2,2
j . From Proposition II.1, the second
solution, (p2,2j , r
2,2
j ), dominates the first one, (p
2,1
j , r
2,1
j ), and is therefore the only
one that occurs under competition. Building on Lemma II.2, Proposition II.1
subsumes the competitive subgame perfect stage game equilibrium.
Lemma II.2. In the stage game, entrepreneur’s participation constraints are
always satisfied at intersection points of the best response functions.
Proof. At an intersection point (pj, rj) of the best response functions we have
rj = 1/pj − 1 and Rj = e′j(pj) + 1/pj , as has been shown before. Therefore, the
participation constraint of an entrepreneur of group j, which is Uj(rj, pj) ≥ 0,
mathematically reduces to e′j(pj) ≥ ej(pj)/pj at the intersection point. This
constraint is always satisfied under the model’s assumption, which is shown in
the following. Since ej(0) = 0 by assumption, we can subtract ej(0)/pj from the
right-hand side of the inequation e′j(p) ≥ ej(pj)/pj to obtain, at some p′j > 0,
e′j(p
′
j) ≥
ej(p
′
j)− ej(0)
p′j
. (68)
Because of the assumption e′′j (p) > 0, the effort function ej(p) is strictly convex
in p. That means that the mean slope of the line segment of ej(pj) between
pj = 0 and pj = p′j, as found on the right-hand side of Eq. (68), is clearly
smaller than the slope of ej(pj) at pj = p′j, as found on the left-hand side.
Hence, Eq. (68) holds if the model’s assumptions about the effort function hold,
and thus e′j(pj) > ej(pj)/pj is satisfied for every pj ∈ ωpj . 
Proposition II.1 (Stage Game Equilibrium). The competitive subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium of the stage game is characterized by non-financing for
entrepreneurs of groups j ∈ G∅ ∪G0, the financing equilibrium is given by
(
θ∗j , p
∗
j
)
=

(
(1, rτj ), p
τ
j
)
if j ∈ G1,(
(1, r2,2j ), p
2,2
j
)
if j ∈ G2.
(69)
Proof. The proof of the non-financing equilibrium and the equilibrium for j ∈ G1
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follow straightforward from Lemmas II.1 and II.2. The competitive equilibrium
for j ∈ G2 is determined as follows. Moving along banks’ offer curve rB(pj), an
entrepreneur’s utility increases with increasing pj if ∂Uj(rB(pj))/∂pj ≡ λj [Rj −
e′j(pj)] > 0. This is obviously true in the stage game if e′j(pj) < Rj which is
certainly the case if j ∈ G2∧pj ∈
[
p2,1j , p
2,2
j
]
according to Lemma II.1 and the set
building condition of G2 in Definition II.1. Hence, Uj
(
r2,2j , p
2,2
j
)
> Uj
(
r2,1j , p
2,1
j
)
.
As both possible financing Nash equilibria for generic group G2 satisfy the
break-even constraint of banks with equality, competition rules out the one
that is inferior for entrepreneurs. 
To assess the efficiency of the stage game equilibrium, I compare it with the
first best solution. The latter is given by the stage game’s equilibrium in
absence of agency problems. As we regard a situation of established information
sharing that has created comprehensive credit registries, problems of adverse
selection do not arise. Moral hazard would be eliminated from my model if
entrepreneurs chose their success probability along the break-even supply curve,
rB(pj), of banks. The first-order condition, ∂Uj[rB(pj)]/∂pj = 0, then reduces
to Rj = e′j(pj). Since Rj is static and greater than zero, and e′j(p) > 0 as well
as e′j(0) = 0 by assumption, there is a unique solution pfbj > 0 to the first-order
condition. If pfbj > p¯j, the utility maximizing pj ∈ ωpj is found at the success
probability’s upper bound, which follows from the uniqueness of the extremum.
When considering entrepreneurs’ optimal choice of pj along banks’ offer curve,
entrepreneurs’ participation constraint reduces to e′j(pj) ≥ 1/pj + ej(pj)/pj.
Proposition II.2 subsumes the first best solution.
Proposition II.2 (First Best Solution). In the first best world there is financing
in equilibrium with loan terms (λ1stj , r1stj ) = (1, rB[p1stj ]), where p1stj = min[pfbj , p¯j ],
if e′j(p1stj ) ≥ 1/p1stj + ej(p1stj )/p1stj .
The participation constraint of entrepreneurs of generic group G∅ (that is, for
p¯j < R
−1
j ) is never satisfied in the first best world. Like in the stage game
solution we do not see financing in this case. For entrepreneurs of groups j ∈ G0,
however, financing can be possible in the first best world, whereas moral hazard
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prevents financing to happen in the stage game equilibrium. Hence, agency
problems lead to underinvestment in projects in the stage game equilibrium.
Whenever we find a financing equilibrium in the stage game (which is always the
case for entrepreneurs of generic groups G1 and G2, according to Lemma II.2),
financing is also found in the first best solution. But the first best financing
equilibrium is characterized by lower credit rates and higher effort choices than
the stage game equilibrium. Thus, moral hazard leads to underinvestment in
effort. Proposition II.3 recapitulates and proofs the efficiency evaluation of the
stage game equilibrium.
Proposition II.3 (Efficiency of the Stage Game Equilibrium). The stage game
equilibrium shows inefficient underinvestment in projects (for j ∈ G0) and in
effort (for j ∈ G1 ∪G2).
Proof. For entrepreneurs of a group j ∈ G0, it is e′j(p) > Rj − 1/p ∀p ∈ ωpj
according to Definition II.1. Entrepreneurs’ participation constraint is satisfied
in the first best world if e′j(p) ≥ 1/p + ej(p)/p for the utility maximizing p,
according to Proposition II.2. With Rj = e′j(p1stj ), this constraint can be written
as Rj − 1/p1stj ≥ ej(p1stj )/p1stj . Since it is e′j(p) > ej(p)/p ∀p ∈ ωpj according
to the proof of Lemma II.2, we see that groups j ∈ G0 exist that satisfy
entrepreneurs’ participation constraint and allow financing to occur in the
first best solution. As there is never financing for j ∈ G0 in the stage game
equilibrium, it is characterized by underinvestment.
The first best solution is the utility maximizing combination out of all the
combinations of credit rate and success probability that lie on banks’ offer
curve, rB(p). In a financing equilibrium of the stage game, banks’ break-even
constraint is binding due to competition, and thus the stage game equilibrium
(r∗j , p
∗
j) also lies on rB(p) but differs from the first best solution. Hence, financing
is always a feasible equilibrium outcome in the first best world whenever it is a
feasible equilibrium outcome in the stage game (and the latter is always the case
for entrepreneurs of generic groups G1 and G2, according to Lemma II.2). The
equilibrium success probability of the stage game is characterized by p∗j < p¯j and
solves the condition e′j(p∗j) = Rj − 1/p∗j , while the first best success probability
is given by p1stj = min(p¯j, pfbj ), where e′j(pfbj ) = Rj. Therefore, it is necessarily
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e′j(p
∗
j) < e
′
j(p
1st
j ). From ej(p), e′j(p), e′′j (p) > 0 ∀p ∈ ωpj follows that p∗j < p1stj and
finally ej(p∗j) < ej(p1stj ). 
2.2 The Repeated Game and Disciplining
We now consider the stage game to be played repeatedly over an indefinite time
horizon. That means, at every endpoint of the stage game in the extensive-form
representation in Fig. 12, the stage game is played again with probability δ,
and so forth. The probability of continuation, δ, is assumed to be constant
and uniform for every entrepreneur after every history h. Let us regard δ to be
less than 1 but very large and approaching 1. The probability of continuation
therefore does not affect nearby project payoffs but prevents dealing with
infinitely large total payoff streams.39 In this setting, disciplining borrowers
becomes conceptually possible since after every period it is highly likely that
there is a next period where consequences of default can carry into effect.
Comprehensive information sharing does now allow banks to not only offer
different terms to entrepreneurs of different qualities but also to entrepreneurs
with different credit histories. Thus, banks can employ the information shared
to establish disciplining by implementing unfavorable consequences subsequent
to entrepreneurs’ defaults. To prevent the possibility of splitting and postponing
consequences of default over the indefinite number of future periods, let us
assume that disciplining is only effective as far as it is implemented in the very
next period after default, and this fact is common knowledge. This assumption
is basically in line with and well-founded in the literature on behavior analysis
where delays in punishment are found to severely and increasingly decrease
disciplining effectiveness (Banks and Vogel-Sprott, 1965; Trenholme and Baron,
1975; Goodall, 1984).
The project utility Uj(h) is an entrepreneur’s expected utility of operating a
one-period project after history h, as stated in Eq. (59). The expected total
39This is true since the assumptions of the model, especially the bounded solution space,
ensure that the magnitude of the project utility is limited at least on the equilibrium path.
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utility of the entrepreneur after history h is generally given by
TUj(h) = Uj(h) + FUj(h) (70)
= Uj(h) + δ pj(h)
[
Uj(h
s) + FUj(h
s)
]
+ δ
(
1− pj(h)
) [
Uj(h
f ) + FUj(h
f )
]
,
(71)
where FUj(h) is defined to be an entrepreneur’s expected utility after history
h of all future periods beyond the current period. More precisely, FUj(h) is the
sum of all future project utilities, excluding Ui(h), for every possible history
following on h, weighted with the probabilities of occurrence conditional on
being after history h. Let probj(h→|h) denote the conditional probability that
history h→ occurs given history h, where it captures the probability of the
particular credit history (that is, the probability of successes and defaults on
the path from h to h→) as well as the probability of continuation. We obtain
FUj(h) =
∑
h→
probj(h
→|h)Uj
[
θj(h
→), pj(h→)
]
. (72)
Since entrepreneurs can choose the success probability for every single project
independently from their past choices, only the utility of the current project,
Uj[θj(h), pj(h)], directly depends on pj(h) while the future project utilities,
Uj[θj(h
→), pj(h→)], depend on entrepreneurs’ independent future choices of
pj(h
→) and on the particular future credit terms. Thus, the first-order condition
to maximize the total utility after history h with respect to pj(h) is given by
∂Uj(h)
∂pj(h)
+ δ
(
Uj(h
s)− Uj(hf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
cj(h)
+FUj(h
s)− FUj(hf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζj(h)
)
= 0. (73)
In the repeated game, consequences of defaulting in the current project can
generally be quantified as the difference between the expected utility of the
future if not defaulting in the current project and the expected utility of the
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future given a default in the current project. Then cj(h) marks the consequences
of defaulting after history h that an entrepreneur of group j expects to face
in the very next period, that is, after history hf . ζj(h) marks the expected
consequences of defaulting after history h that occur in future periods two or
more periods after the default, that is, after histories hf→. With the assumption
that consequences that are not implemented in the very next period after
default are ineffective for disciplining borrowers, entrepreneurs are implicitly
assumed to consider ζj(h) = 0 for their effort choice. Thus, with δ approaching
1, the best response of an entrepreneur to credit terms θj(h) =
(
λj(h), rj(h)
)
after history h satisfies
rˆj(h) = Rj − 1− e′j[pj(h)] + cj(h)/λj(h). (74)
In comparison to the stage game, the best response function of entrepreneurs
additionally depends on the expected consequences of default relative to the
credit volume of the current financing. Strictly positive expected consequences
of default result in an upward shift of entrepreneurs’ best response functions
in comparison to the stage game. If, however, no disciplining is applied, that
means that cj(h) = 0 ∀h, we have rˆj(h) = rˆ0j ∀h and the repeated stage game
equilibrium forms a feasible Nash equilibrium of the iterated game. The total
utility that entrepreneurs of quality group j obtain from the repeated stage
game equilibrium is given by
TU∗j = lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
δt Uj(θ
∗
j , p
∗
j) =
Uj(θ
∗
j , p
∗
j)
1− δ . (75)
Since the model does not entail costs of switching the lender, since banks
face perfect competition, and since comprehensive credit registries prevent
endogenous informational advantages of particular inside banks, the iterated
game can essentially be viewed as a sequence of one-shot games from a bank’s
perspective. Hence, banks need to break even on every loan and their break-even
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offer curve in case of disciplining remains unchanged in comparison to the stage
game analysis.
Under the previously stated presupposition that punishment is only effective
if it occurs without delay, I conceptionally follow the equilibrium notion of
sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) in the repeated game. That
generally means that banks and entrepreneurs form believes about each other’s
future strategy choices at every information set. Specifically, for a given credit
contract after a history h, entrepreneurs of group j form rational believes
about future credit terms that banks offer after possible successors of history h.
This is essentially equivalent to saying that entrepreneurs form believes about
consequences of default.If entrepreneurs’ a priori believes about consequences
of default are not met after a default (that is, actual consequences differ
from expected consequences), entrepreneurs integrate this deviation as new
information in their belief formation about future consequences.40
A financing equilibrium in the repeated game is still characterized by agreement
of best response functions in the solution space Ωj after every history h. Thus,
from rˆj(h) = rB we obtain the equilibrium condition
e′j[pj(h)] = Rj − 1/pj(h) + cj(h)/λj(h) ∀h. (76)
If positive consequences can actually be implemented and are robust to compe-
tition, different equilibria than in the stage game become possible. The repeated
stage game equilibrium acts as a benchmark for equilibria with disciplining to
show if and under which conditions disciplining can improve the efficiency of
the market. In the following section I analyze disciplining by pro rata credit
rationing for that matter.
40It is a general question if deviations from the equilibrium path are considered as information
or as errors. By using the concept of sequential equilibrium I follow the former view which
is captured by believe-updating in case of unanticipated events.
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3 Disciplining by Credit Rationing
Let us now consider that banks make use of the information shared through
credit registries to implement pro rata credit rationing as a disciplining device.
That means that banks can adjust the credit volume offered to a borrower
with respect to the credit history of the borrower. To analyze the pure effect of
disciplining by credit rationing, let us presume for this section that banks apply
solely credit rationing as disciplining device and do not additionally execute
changes in the credit rate.41 For a constant credit rate rj(h) = rj ∀h offered
to entrepreneurs of quality group j, banks break even in every financing in a
competitive market environment only if entrepreneurs constantly choose the
success probability pj := pB(rj ). From entrepreneurs’ best response function
in Eq. (74) follows that an entrepreneur’s optimal choice of the project’s
success probability is only constant for a given constant credit rate if the
expected consequences of default in relation to the current credit volume are
constant. Let us denote these expected relative consequences of default by
σj(h) := cj(h)/λj(h). To implement entrepreneurs’ probability choice pj for a
given credit rate rj , the corresponding constant relative consequences of default
σj need, according to the equilibrium condition in Eq. (76), to satisfy
σj = 1/p

j −Rj + e′j(pj). (77)
Since disciplining consequences that do not occur in the very next period
after default are assumed to be ineffective and entrepreneurs’ preferences are
modeled to be monotonic increasing in the credit volume, competing banks
offer the maximum credit volume of one monetary unit to entrepreneurs after
a successful project if they offer financing at all, that is, λj(hs) = 1 ∀h, j; the
same is generally true after non-financing, that is, after a history h0, but this
41Generally, I allow changes in the credit rate to happen as far as they do not contribute to
changes in project utility. This is, however, not possible in my model unless the credit rate
remains unchanged.
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case is discussed specifically later in the text. An entrepreneur’s project utility
is therefore uniform after every history hs and given by
U sj := Uj[(1, r

j ), p

j ] = p

jRj − 1− ej(pj). (78)
Let us call U sj base utility of entrepreneurs of quality group j.
The credit volume after a history hf , however, depends on the particular
history h and not just on the fact that a default occurred after history h.
More precisely, the credit volume λj(hf) depends on the number of previous
consecutive defaults, which shall be seen in the following. With the hitherto
results of this section, the expected consequences of default can be written as
cj(h) = U
s
j −Uj(hf ) = [1− λj(hf )]U sj . This shows the general relation between
the expected consequences of default, cj(h), and the corresponding rationed
credit volume after a default, λj(hf). By rearranging we obtain a recursive
relation between the current credit volume, λj(h), and the subsequent credit
volume after default, λj(hf ), that corresponds to the constant expected relative
consequences σj that are required to implement pj for a given rj ,
λj(h
f ) = 1− σ

j λj(h)
U sj
= 1 + αj λj(h), (79)
where I define αj := −σj/U sj . There obviously only is credit rationing after de-
fault if αj < 0 which is true for U sj , σj > 0. Of course, disciplining entrepreneurs
in repeated lending can naturally not work if their participation constraint is
even violated after a history hs and they always refuse to take out a loan to
operate the project. And since the credit volume is simply scaling the base
utility U sj , credit rationing can neither induce a disciplining punishment if en-
trepreneurs’ participation constraint is satisfied with equality after a successful
project operation, that is, if the base utility is zero.
If αj = −1, Eq. (79) cannot be used. In that case, the required expected
relative consequences, σj , exactly match entrepreneurs’ base utility U sj . Thus,
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the punishment that is required after default is total redlining, which means
that the borrower should not get a loan in the period after a default. It follows
that the history hf0 always needs to be the direct successor of a history hf , that
is, hf+ = hf0 ∀h. Thus, Eq. (79) is not defined for histories h = hf if αj = −1
since it is not possible to default in a project when not operating a project.
The case αj = −1 is therefore the single exception to the previously stated
rule that the credit volume after a default depends on the number of previous
consecutive defaults. In this case we simply require non-financing after every
default, and after success or redlining we are back to the base utility, that is,
λj(h
s) = λj(h
0) = 1 ∀h, j if financing is possible at all.
If αj 6= −1, the recursive relation in Eq. (79) is generally applicable after
every history h to calculate the credit volume after a default that matches the
expected relative consequences of default σj . Starting with a history hs which,
as we already know, is characterized by λj(hs) = 1 ∀h, j, we recursively obtain
λj(h
sf ) = 1 + αj ∀h, (80)
λj(h
sff ) = 1 + αj + α
2
j ∀h, (81)
λj(h
sfn) = 1 + αj + α
2
j + α
3
j + . . .+ α
n
j ∀h, (82)
where hsfn denotes a series of n ∈ N0 consecutive defaults subsequent to a
history hs. The closed form formula for this geometric series is given by
λj(h
sfn) =
1− αn+1j
1− αj . (83)
If entrepreneurs’ believes about the credit volumes that banks offer after all
possible histories hsfn match with the sequence λj(hsf
n
), then entrepreneurs
expect constant relative consequences σj for a credit rate rj and disciplining
by credit rationing can work. But entrepreneurs can reasonably expect these
consequences only if they are, first, feasible and, second, robust to financing
market competition.
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Consequences are not credible after a history h if they require a punishment
after some following history h→ that is too large to be implemented. That is the
case if the required punishing credit volume ever falls below zero, or technically
if ∃n ∈ N0 : λj(hsfn) < 0. The sequence λj(hsfn) is Cauchy for |αj| < 1 (and
αj 6= 0) and converges to the limit limn→∞ λj(hsfn) = 1/(1− αj). Under the
condition −1 < αj < 0, the elements of the convergent sequence fluctuate
around the limit with decreasing distance for increasing n, which follows from
∂λj(h
f )/∂λj(h) = αj and is illustrated in Fig. 14: the greater the current credit
volume, the greater next period’s credit rationing after default. The smallest
value of the convergent sequence is therefore found for n = 1, that is, after a
history hsf , since the maximum credit volume of one monetary unit is provided
after histories hs. This smallest credit volume λj(hsf) = 1 + αj is obviously
strictly greater than zero if the condition for convergence holds. Thus, if the
sequence λj(hsf
n
) is Cauchy, it is λj(hsf
n
) > 0 ∀n ∈ N0 and consequences of
default that are in line with the sequence λj(hsf
n
) are feasible for a strictly
positive base utility. Proposition II.4 subsumes.
Proposition II.4 (Feasibility of Disciplining by Credit Rationing). Disciplin-
ing by credit rationing is feasible if αj ∈ [−1, 0) or, equivalently, 0 < σj ≤ U sj .
Like in the stage game and the first best solution, disciplining by credit rationing
cannot lead to financing of entrepreneurs of generic group G∅ since disciplining
by credit rationing is evidently never feasible in that case because of U sj < 0. For
entrepreneurs of generic group G0, however, Lemma II.3 proofs that disciplining
by credit rationing can be feasible and allow financing, while financing always
fails for these entrepreneurs without disciplining, as shown in the stage game
solution.
Lemma II.3. Entrepreneurs of generic group G0 exist for whom disciplining
by credit rationing is feasible, or stated formally, ∃j ∈ G0 : αj ∈ [−1, 0).
Proof. We have j ∈ G0 if e′j(p) > Rj − 1/p ∀p ∈ ωpj . This is equivalent to the
statement e′j(pτj ) > Rj − 1/pτj since the reaction functions are closest to each
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Figure 14: Illustration of the sequence λj (h
sfn) for αj ∈ (−1, 0).
other at pτj for j ∈ G0. Solving for Rj gives Rj < R0j := e′j(pτj ) + 1/pτj . The
feasibility constraint in Proposition II.4 reduces to σj ≤ U sj since 0 < σj is
clearly always true for j ∈ G0. Rewriting and solving for Rj yields
Rj ≥ Rj :=
1 + pj + p

j [ej(p

j) + e
′
j(p

j)]
pj + (p

j)
2
. (84)
For the same p, R0j > Rj reduces to e′j(p) > ej(p)/p which has been shown to be
always true under the model’s assumptions in the proof of Lemma II.2. Further
we obviously have R0j > 1. Hence, groups j of entrepreneurs with qualities
pij = (Rj, ej(p), p¯j) exist that satisfy Rj ≤ Rj < R0j for some disciplining
contract θj and they therefore simultaneously belong to generic group G0 and
meet the feasibility constraint of disciplining by credit rationing. 
Whenever we see financing in the stage game equilibrium (that is, for en-
trepreneurs of generic groups G1 and G2), disciplining by credit rationing is
feasible. This can be seen from the following argument. If we have a financing
equilibrium (θ∗j , p∗j) in the stage game, the base utility U sj for σj = 0 is equal to
the stage game equilibrium utility Uj(θ∗j , p∗j) which is strictly positive according
to Lemma II.2. Thus, there are clearly at least some arbitrarily small though
strictly positive consequences σj for which disciplining by credit rationing
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provides a strictly positive base utility U sj ≥ σj and therefore satisfies the
feasibility condition in Proposition II.4.
Feasibility of disciplining by credit rationing, however, is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition that entrepreneurs’ believes about future credit volumes
match with the sequence λj(hsf
n
). The punishment also needs to be robust to
strategic interaction in a competitive financing market, that is, banks should
not be expected to deviate. That means that pursuing the consequences in
the face of a default needs to be an equilibrium choice of banks although fully
comprehensive credit registries equip banks with a fully comprehensive assess-
ment of entrepreneurs’ qualities that cannot be further refined by additional
default information. To address this issue let us consider an entrepreneur of
quality group j who is offered the financing contract θj(hsf
n
) = (λj(h
sfn), rj )
to operate the project after a credit history hsfn that is characterized by n
previous consecutive defaults. The bank that offers this contract requires the
entrepreneur to apply effort ej(pj) to the project, which the entrepreneur only
does if she expects corresponding relative consequences of σj in case of a default.
But, if the entrepreneur’s project fails after history hsfn , why should a bank in
the following period offer the credit volume λj(hsf
n+1
) that corresponds to the
expected consequences σj instead of offering a greater or even the maximum
credit volume of 1 which provides greater utility to the entrepreneur and could
win her over to the bank?42 If a bank offers a credit volume greater than
λj(h
sfn+1) after a history hsfn+1 , the entrepreneur recognizes the deviation from
her expected relative consequences σj and makes a downward revision of her
believes about future consequences of default according to this new information.
But expecting less future consequences because of less currently experienced
consequences shifts the entrepreneur’s best response function and she applies
less effort than ej(pj) to the current project for the same credit rate rj . This
results in expected losses for the bank. Hence, it is in the own interest of a bank
42Smaller credit volumes are inferior for entrepreneurs and therefore not a relevant strategic
choice of banks in the face of competition.
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to pursue consequences of σj after default for a given feasible credit rate rj .
Feasible and robust disciplining by credit rationing is only found in equilibrium
if entrepreneurs prefer it over the repeated stage game solution. Since feasibility
requires a positive base utility, entrepreneurs always prefer feasible disciplining
by credit rationing over non-financing. Hence, disciplining by credit rationing
is an equilibrium choice of entrepreneurs of generic group G0 whenever it is
feasible. For generic groups G1 and G2 the analysis is less straightforward. As
shown before, feasible and robust disciplining by credit rationing provides a
utility of U sj to entrepreneurs after every successful project, and after failure
they receive the utility U sj λj(hsf
n
), depending on the number of previous
consecutive defaults n. Because of this path-dependency, the binomial tree of
the project payoffs can show different payoff levels at the same nodes of the tree,
contingent on the particular path (that is, on the particular credit history). The
probability to get to node m of the binomial tree after t trials with n previous
consecutive defaults is—neglecting the probability of continuation—given by
prob(t,m, n) =
(
t− (n+ 1)
m− n
)
(pj)
t−m (1− pj)m, (85)
where 0 ≤ n ≤ m ≤ t. The probability that n previous consecutive defaults
occur after t periods is then, for n < t, given by
t−1∑
m=n
prob(t,m, n) = (1− pj)n pj . (86)
After a history hs, the utility that entrepreneurs of quality group j can expect
to receive in the t-th period after history hs can therefore be stated as43
δt (1− pj)t U sj λj(hsf
n
) + δt
t−1∑
n=0
U sj λ

j(h
sfn) (1− pj)n pj . (87)
43While the assumption that delayed consequences of default are ineffective affects en-
trepreneurs’ effort choice, entrepreneurs’ contract choice is not directly affected.
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The total expected utility for disciplining by credit rationing is then given by
TUj = lim
T→∞
T∑
t=1
[
δt (1− pj)t U sj λj(hsf
t
) + δt
t−1∑
n=0
U sj λ

j(h
sfn) (1− pj)npj
]
=
U sj
(1− δ)[1− (1− pj)δαj]
. (88)
Disciplining by credit rationing is preferred by entrepreneurs of quality group j
over the repeated stage game solution if TU∗j < TUj which simplifies to the
condition
Uj(θ
∗
j , p
∗
j) <
U sj
1− (1− pj)αj
. (89)
Lemma II.4 proofs that there is always disciplining by credit rationing that is
superior to the repeated stage game equilibrium for entrepreneurs of generic
group G1. And there also is superior disciplining in a wide parameter space,
albeit not always, for entrepreneurs of a group j ∈ G2, as proven in Lemma II.4
and illustrated by Fig. 15 in which curly braces mark the p∗j space where
disciplining by credit rationing is clearly preferred. Figure 16 finally shows the
new equilibria that can emerge with disciplining by credit rationing for different
generic groups in comparison to the stage game equilibria.
Lemma II.4. TU∗j < TUj is always true for j ∈ G1. For j ∈ G2, TU∗j < TUj
is true if e′′j (p∗j) < 1/[(p∗j)2 − (p∗j)3].44
Proof. The stage game financing equilibrium, (r∗j , p∗j), is characterized by
no disciplining, that is, zero consequence of default and we therefore have
lim(rj ,pj )→(r∗j ,p∗j ) TU

j = TU
∗
j .45 Thus, if the total utility of disciplining by credit
44The condition for generic groups G2 captures most and the most reasonable, albeit not all,
of the cases where TU∗j < TUj is true. There are some pj > pbj for which disciplining by
credit rationing is also superior to the repeated stage game equilibrium for p∗j ∈ [paj , pbj ).
45Expected consequences of default shift an entrepreneur’s best response function upwards.
Thus, there are two intersection points of the entrepreneur’s shifted best response func-
tion and banks’ offer curve. With the same expected consequences of default, the upper
intersection point (that is, the one at greater p) provides greater utility than the lower one
since moving along banks’ offer curve towards the lower intersection point (which is always
smaller than the tangency point pτj ) results in a decreasing base utility.
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(a) e′′j (p∗j ) cuts 1/[(p∗j )2 − (p∗j )3].
(b) e′′j (p∗j ) < 1/[(p∗j )2 − (p∗j )3] ∀p∗j ∈ ωpj .
Figure 15: Illustration of Lemma II.4: p∗j space (curly braces) where TU
∗
j < TU

j
for generic groups G1 and G2.
rationing (that is, the right-hand side of Eq. (89)) has a positive slope in p
at the point (r∗j , p∗j), TU∗j < TUj is clearly true. Calculating the first partial
derivative of U sj /[1 − (1 − pj)αj] at p∗j and considering that σj(p∗j) = 0 gives
the following condition for a positive slope of TUj at p∗j :
Rj − e′j(p∗j) > (1− p∗j)
[
e′′j (p
∗
j)− 1/(p∗j)2
]
. (90)
For the stage game equilibrium applies Rj− e′j(p∗j) = 1/p∗j . Equation (90) hence
becomes
e′′j (p
∗
j) <
1
(p∗j)2 − (p∗j)3
. (91)
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Since 1/[(p∗j)2 − (p∗j)3] > 1/(p∗j)2 and 1/(pτj )2 = e′′j (pτj ), the condition is always
satisfied for p∗j = pτj , that is, for entrepreneurs of generic group G1. For j ∈ G2,
it is p∗j > pτj and we need further analysis. e′′j (p) intersects 1/(p2 − p3) twice,
tangentially once, or never in the domain p ∈ (0, 1). Denoting these intersections
paj and pbj , where paj ≤ pbj , we can state that Eq. (91) holds if p∗j ∈ [pτj , paj) or
p∗j ∈ (pbj , p¯j). If there is no intersection, Eq. (91) holds for every p∗j ≥ pτj .
Figure 15 illustrates. 
By comparing the disciplining equilibrium with the repeated stage game equi-
librium we can assess the efficiency of disciplining by credit rationing. For
entrepreneurs of generic group G0, disciplining can Pareto improve the market
efficiency by overcoming financing market failure and partially healing underin-
vestment in projects that occur without disciplining. Overinvestment in projects
due to disciplining by credit rationing does not happen since disciplining is
never feasible if financing is not possible in the first best solution. This is true
since the feasibility constraint of disciplining by credit rationing is strictly
stricter than the condition for financing in the first best world.
In cases in which financing is possible without disciplining (in generic groups
G1 and G2), disciplining by credit rationing can Pareto improve the market
outcome and heal underinvestment in effort since effort levels are always higher
in comparison to the (repeated) stage game equilibrium. Depending on the
parameter set of the market segment, entrepreneurs’ effort can be increased
closer to the first best level, even reach the first best level, or sporadically
overshoot it. This results in lower default probabilities due to disciplining by
credit rationing. Proposition II.5 subsumes.
Proposition II.5 (Efficiency of Disciplining by Credit Rationing). Disciplining
by credit rationing can Pareto improve the efficiency of the financing market
and reduce default probabilities in presence of comprehensive credit information
sharing. It can, first, overcome market failure and thereby mitigate underinvest-
ment in projects (for j ∈ G0) and, second, mitigate underinvestment in effort
(for j ∈ G1 ∪G2).
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(a) j ∈ G0.
(b) j ∈ G1.
(c) j ∈ G2.
Figure 16: Best response functions and financing equilibria with and without disci-
plining by credit rationing for different generic groups G.
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The positive effects of disciplining by credit rationing are achieved at the price of
equilibrium credit rationing in the sense of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981): whenever
entrepreneurs are punished with lower credit volumes after default, they are
willing to borrow more at the same and even at a higher credit rate, and banks
actually do lend more to quality-wise identical entrepreneurs,46 but rationing
is yet stable in equilibrium. However, aggregate credit rationing in the market
(or its segments G) is, in the context of my model, shown to be connected to
improvements of the market’s efficiency. Credit rationing is therefore, as in
de Mesa and Webb (1992), not a case for government intervention, contrary to
a substantial previous literature on credit rationing (Jaffee and Russell, 1976;
Keeton, 1979; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, 1983; Williamson, 1986).
4 Limitations of Disciplining by Credit Rate Tightening
Instead of rationing the credit volume, banks could also tighten the credit rate
for the next loan as a disciplining consequence after an entrepreneur’s default.
Higher credit rates actually are the only possible unfavorable consequences of
default in Vercammen (1995) and Padilla and Pagano (2000).
Let us regard the credit volume to remain unchanged to isolate the effect of
credit rate tightening. Due to competition, the maximum credit volume of 1
monetary unit will therefore be offered whenever financing is offered at all, that
is, λj(h) = 1 ∀h, j. For a credit contract
(
1, r.j (h)
)
offered to entrepreneurs
of quality group j after history h, banks break even if entrepreneurs choose
the corresponding success probability p.j(h) := pB[r.j (h)]. But entrepreneurs
only choose the required effort level ej[p.j(h)] if it satisfies their best response
function in Eq. (74), that is, if their believes about future credit rates manifest
in consequences of default of c.j(h) = 1 + r.j (h)−Rj + e′j [p.j(h)]. From Eq. (76),
46Entrepreneurs of the same quality obtain greater credit volumes than others if they either
did not default in the previous project, or they are characterized by a different (not
necessarily greater) number of previous consecutive defaults.
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an equilibrium requires that
c.j(h) = 1/p
.
j(h)−Rj + e′j[p.j(h)] ∀h. (92)
According to the equilibrium condition, equilibrium pairs
(
r.j (h), p
.
j(h)
)
always
lie on banks’ best response function rB(pj). Since rB(pj) is monotonic decreasing
in pj, a tighter credit rate results in a lower effort level and therefore leads
to a higher probability of default. This constitutes a conceptual problem of
disciplining by credit rate tightening. Increasing the credit rate as disciplining
punishment reduces the incentives to perform of defaulting entrepreneurs in
comparison to succeeding ones of the same quality. Entrepreneurs therefore
become more likely to default again if they have defaulted once.
Another limitation of disciplining by credit rate tightening is that it fails to be
feasible in many cases where disciplining by credit rationing is feasible. This
is illustrated in the following. Positive expected consequences of default shift
entrepreneurs’ best response functions upwards. Let us define the newly arising
intersection points of entrepreneurs’ and banks’ best response functions to be
at rloj (h) and rhij (h), where rloj (h) ≤ rhij (h). Both of these credit rates can be
achieved for the same expected consequences but after a history hs the smaller
credit rate rloj (h) (that corresponds to a higher success probability) provides a
greater base utility to entrepreneurs and therefore dominates the larger credit
rate rhij (hs). Thus, in equilibrium we have r.j (hs) = rloj (hs) for the corresponding
c.j(h
s).
Due to the assumption that disciplining consequences are only effective if
they occur in the very next period after a default, in a competitive financing
market the same loan contract is offered to and chosen by every entrepreneur
of the same quality group j after a successful project. The project utility of
entrepreneurs of the same quality group j is therefore uniform after every
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history hs and given by
U¯.j := Uj
[(
1, r.j (h
s)
)
, p.j(h
s)
]
= p.j(h
s)Rj − 1− ej[p.j(hs)] = const. ∀h. (93)
Let us call U¯.j base utility of entrepreneurs of quality group j in case of
disciplining by credit rate tightening. If a default occurs after a history hs,
the expected consequences of default c.j(hs) are realized in the next period if
banks offer a tightened credit rate r.j (hsf) such that the project utility after
default satisfies Uj
[(
1, r.j (h
sf )
)
, p.j(h
sf )
]
= U¯.j − c.j(hs). For n ∈ N0 consecutive
defaults subsequent to a history hs, we can write the general relation between
the consequences c.j(hsf
n
) that are expected to take effect in the next period
in case of defaulting in the current project and the credit rate r.j (hsf
n+1
) that
actually brings these expected consequences into effect after a default as
c.j(h
sfn) = U¯.j − Uj
[(
1, r.j (h
sfn+1)
)
, p.j(h
sfn+1)
]
. (94)
To be feasible, disciplining by credit rate tightening obviously requires that
0 < c.j(h
sfn) ≤ U¯.j ∀n.
For the same credit contract terms (1, rj) after a history hs, it is p.j(hs) = pj
and the required consequences of default are the same for disciplining by credit
rate tightening and disciplining by credit rationing: it is c.j(hs) = σj and also
U¯.j = U
s
j . If 0 < c.j(hs) = σj ≤ U¯.j = U sj , disciplining by credit rationing is
feasible, as I have shown previously, because the punishment after the first
default is the most severe. This is, however, not generally true for disciplining by
credit rate tightening. If the punishing credit rate r.j (hsf ) that implements the
expected consequences c.j(hs) after a history hsf is characterized by r.j (hsf ) >
rhij (h
s), the expected consequences after the second consecutive default need
to be greater than those after the first, that is, c.j(hsf) > c.j(hs). This follows
from the fact that the previous consequences result in an intersection point of
the best response functions at rhij (hs) and increased expected consequences are
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required to shift entrepreneurs’ best response functions further upwards to give
an intersection at a larger credit rate, as required in equilibrium. This process
goes on: greater consequences of default result in an even tighter credit rate
which in turn requires even greater consequences after a further default, and so
forth. The consequences of default do in general not converge in the number of
consecutive defaults for reasonable effort functions. This leads to a punishment
excess for consecutive defaults that lets disciplining by credit rate tightening
break down while disciplining by credit rationing is feasible.
Figure 17a illustrates this punishment excess in a four-quadrant visualization.
Quadrant I shows the local equilibrium condition after a history h by means
of the best response functions of the bank (solid black) and the entrepreneurs
without (dashed gray) and with disciplining by credit rate tightening (solid gray).
For a credit rate r.j (h) after a history h, the required success probability p.j(h)
is obtained. Quadrant II gives the corresponding expected consequences c.j(h)
according to the equilibrium condition in Eq. (92). The lightgray filling marks
the space where the feasibility constraint, 0 < c.j(h) ≤ U¯.j , is locally47 satisfied.
The punishing credit rate, r.j (hf ), that realizes the expected consequences after
a default is given by quadrant III following Eq. (94). Quadrant IV transfers
the tightened credit rate back to quadrant I where the process begins anew.
Starting at the black star in quadrant I for a given credit contract
(
1, r.j (h
s)
)
after a history hs, the solid lightgray lines guide the way through the quadrants.
It can be seen how implementing consequences of default requires even greater
consequences of further defaults at a growing rate. This punishment excess
finally results in required consequences that are too large to be implemented as
they leave the lightgray feasibility space in quadrant II. Hence, disciplining by
credit rate tightening fails to be feasible for the given contract. Disciplining
by credit rationing, however, works since σj = c.j(hs) apparently satisfies the
feasibility constraint.
47I call it ‘locally’ because the graph shows the feasibility constraint only after one history,
but feasible disciplining by credit rate tightening requires satisfaction after every history.
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Out[503]=
(a) Punishment excess.
Out[96]=
(b) Punishment undershooting.
Figure 17: Limitations of disciplining by credit rate tightening in four quadrants.
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The limitations of disciplining by credit rate tightening are particularly severe
for entrepreneurs of generic group G2. Since negative punishment after default
is neither reasonable nor possible, an additional constraint for the punishing
credit rate is given by r.j (hsf
n
) /∈ [r2,1j , r2,2j ] ∀n. That means that the tightened
credit rate has to satisfy r.j (hs) > r2,1 after a history hsf ,48 which requires
immense punishment after default while, as shown before, disciplining by credit
rationing is always feasible for little consequences in case of j ∈ G2.
But even if this constraint is met for j ∈ G2, disciplining by credit rate
tightening is still very prone to failing. Whenever punishment excess is avoided
by r.j (hsf ) < rloj (hs), with the same argument as before we can state that now
the expected consequences after the second default need to decrease to induce
an intersection of the best response functions. Hence, the required punishing
credit rate, r.j (hsf
n
), can (and in many cases does) run between r2,1 and r2,2 for
some n and thereby undershoots the possible punishment which induces failure.
This is illustrated by the four-quadrant visualization in Fig. 17b which also
shows the discussed requirement of immense initial consequences. The graph is
to be understood exactly like Fig. 17a. It can be seen how, for a given contract
(marked by the black star), punishment undershooting leads to a failure of
disciplining by credit rate tightening, while disciplining by credit rationing is
apparently feasible.
5 Policy Implications for Credit Reporting Systems
Important parameters of credit reporting systems are, first, the type and the
level of detail of the information included in the registry, second, the participants
of the credit reporting system that provide and access the information and,
third, the transparency of the first two parameters.
48A rate r.j (hs) < r2,2 is not feasible since best response functions intersect at r2,2 for
zero consequences, and U¯sj − c.j (hs) decreases in p.j (hs). Hence, from Eq. (94), increasing
expected consequences of default result in increasing r.j (hs).
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To allow for disciplining as presented in my model, credit reporting apparently
needs to include default information as well as contract-specific data like credit
volumes or credit rates. Actual credit registries usually contain contract-specific
information but there is few previous literature that can explain why lenders
share these data instead of only sharing information concerning borrower quality
(like payment and default information). An exception is Bennardo et al. (2015)
who show that the possibility of multi-bank lending can produce incentives to
overborrow which can be mitigated by sharing contract-specific information
about past debts. My work provides a different and very direct reason to share
such information since setting up and maintaining disciplining has been shown
to require specifics about previous contracts.
My model demonstrates that disciplining is not compromised if the registry
contains more information than required and it even works for comprehensive
registries. Overly informative credit registries are therefore noncritical for
disciplining. The previous theoretical literature about borrower discipline due to
credit information sharing focuses on reputation effects and finds that too much
information can lead to inferior outcomes since reputation effects diminish with
an increasing informativeness of credit registries (Vercammen, 1995; Padilla and
Pagano, 2000).49 It is concluded that the amount of quality-relevant information
that is shared is a critical element to the design of credit registries. Hence, to
save reputation effects from diminishing and finally disappearing when the credit
registries mature and become more comprehensive, the literature suggests to
reduce the informativeness of credit registries by partially preventing access to
credit histories (Vercammen, 1995) or by randomizing credit information sharing
(Padilla and Pagano, 2000). However, artificially confining the informativeness
of credit registries in the suggested ways comes with problems. First, other
positive effects of credit information sharing are hurt, namely the mitigation of
adverse selection (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993) and hold-up problems (Padilla
49The negative effect of too much information has also been obtained by Diamond (1991)
and Crémer (1995) in different frameworks.
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and Pagano, 1997). Second, partial information sharing can be used by banks
as a strategic tool to reduce banking competition since new entrants into
the banking market are particularly affected by confined credit registries and
therefore prevented from competitive bidding for some borrowers (Bouckaert
and Degryse, 2006).
Participants of credit reporting systems need not only be banks. The credit
registry can also be opened to non-lenders. A broader access to registries is
of economic value if the participants of the credit reporting system mutually
contribute to the registry to quickly obtain extensive, more detailed, and differ-
entiated information. This leads to efficiency-enhancing mitigation of adverse
selection and hold-up problems in different sectors, but also to quickly diminish-
ing reputation effects. A broad access to credit registries can be problematic if
the registry contains only scarce information. In that case, the reputation effect
can be very strong and easily become too strong. If numerous participants
of different sectors evaluate a borrower’s reputation on the basis of her loan
repayment, this can lead to inefficient underinvestment and even prevent fi-
nancing entirely. To control the magnitude of the total reputation effects seems
non-trivial.
If, however, a broadly accessed credit registry is informationally confined in
order to preserve reputation effects, problems related to those in Bouckaert and
Degryse (2006) can arise, as outlined in the following. Borrowers’ incentives to
perform can be increased either by reputation effects or by disciplining. While
reputation effects have the huge problem to diminish with more information,
disciplining is robust to information but is more expensive than “passive”
reputation effects because it requires to implement consequences of default.
If these consequences are implemented with deteriorating credit terms, they
reduce banks’ profits and business volumes after defaults.50 Consequently, it
would be in the interest of banks to outsource costly disciplining, which would
50Although disciplining by adjusting next period’s credit terms can increase market efficiency,
as shown in my model, it is not perfectly efficient in increasing the efficiency.
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require consequences that are exogenous to the credit business and therefore
not lead to a deterioration of lending terms after default.51 One can think
of two basic ways to achieve this. First, by building on non-monetary social
costs. However, these can usually only occur in very special cases, for example
in joint-liability microlending (Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990; Besley and Coate,
1995). Second, by broadening access to credit registries and have others, in
particular non-lenders, implement consequences of loan defaults.
To execute the second point, banks need to artificially confine the broadly shared
information such that the resulting reputation effects constitute consequences
of default. This can be satisfied by a confinement that preserves reputation
effects and makes them take effect after the undesirable event of a loan default,
which is in line with “black-listing” practices to share only negative information
and to strictly limit the memory of the registry to current entries. To subsume,
banks can have incentives to use confined information sharing as a strategic
tool to cheaply create exogenous consequences of default. In this way, banks
outsource consequences of default to others by using credit reporting as a
system of finger-pointing on defaulters.
The discussed problems can be prevented by policies that do not confine credit
reporting artificially but, instead, promote positive and negative credit reporting
to obtain a more complete picture of borrowers, and that foster a level playing
field for all participants of credit reporting systems.52 A level playing field
requires, for instance, absence of discrimination towards particular participants
of the credit reporting system, that is, equal access for all participants to
read information and also to supplement data. Then, more differentiated and
accurate information about the data subjects arise in greater pace. This can
51Another shortcoming of disciplining is solved by exogenous consequences: consequences of
default affect borrowers asymmetrically. That is, tighter credit rates are not paid if the
borrower defaults again, and scaled-down project returns due to rationed credit are anyway
not earned if the project fails again. Thus, if a defaulting borrower defaults again, she is
generally not at all or much less affected by the consequences of the previous default than
in case of a success, which partially opposes the desired effect of disciplining.
52See also World Bank (2011) for a discussion.
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both mitigate the possibility to exploit credit registries for strategic reasons
and reduce market inefficiencies due to asymmetric information.
My work also implicates that consequences of default to discipline borrowers
can only be effective if they are expected by borrowers, and they are efficient if
the expectations are sufficiently accurate. Transparency about the extend of
information sharing and the access to registries is therefore essential to enable
borrowers to form accurate believes about the total consequences of default.
6 Conclusion
The existing literature shows that credit information sharing between lenders
disciplines borrowers and increases their incentives to perform because defaulting
with one lender ruins the reputation with every other lender. This reputation
effect, however, is fragile since the existence and the extent of the effect heavily
depend on and vary with the particular information set that lenders possess
about particular borrowers. A new piece of data affects lenders’ assessment of
a borrower’s quality and therefore her reputation less, the more comprehensive
lenders’ information about the borrower is.
The purpose of this work is to show that credit information sharing can
induce borrower discipline beyond “passive” reputation effects by actively using
the information shared. I therefore provide a different approach to discipline
borrowers on the basis of credit information sharing: classical disciplining.
In a multi-period model of repeated lending, I show that disciplining is feasible
and can reduce problems of moral hazard by increasing borrowers’ incentives to
perform. Disciplining can Pareto improve the efficiency of the financing market
and reduce defaults by overcoming market failure and mitigating underinvest-
ment in projects and in effort. But unlike reputation effects, disciplining is
robust to the level of informativeness of credit registries (as long as the required
information is included) and even works for comprehensive and unrestricted
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credit registries. Hence, to complement and compensate reputation effects with
disciplining seems to be a better and more efficient approach than, as suggested
in the literature, preventing reputation effects from diminishing by constraining
or randomizing credit information sharing which provokes inefficiencies on other
levels.
The model also yields results beyond its main purpose. First, disciplining
requires contract-specific data of past debts and can therefore provide a direct
explanation why this information is actually shared in addition to quality-
relevant information (Bennardo et al., 2015). Second, disciplining borrowers by
pro rata rationing their next credit after a default shows to be more promising
than tightening the credit rate since the latter reduces borrowers incentives
to perform after a default and can lead to punishment excesses. This result
is a possible explanation for the observation that banks rather change credit
availability than credit rates when their costs of lending shift (Petersen and
Rajan, 1994). Third, disciplining by credit rationing constitutes aggregate
equilibrium credit rationing in the sense of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). But since
it enhances the efficiency of the market, my model provides a rare case of efficient
equilibrium credit rationing that is not a case for government intervention.
Future research could compare different concept of disciplining in more detail
and in different frameworks. On the one hand, the problems of credit rate
tightening could be studied in more depth. On the other hand, new disciplinary
devices like tightening collateral requirements could be analyzed. Future empir-
ical work could, first, try to distinguish different effects of credit information
sharing and, second, endeavor to filter reputation effects in order to distinguish
them from, for instance, disciplining. That could also enable to discriminate
between efficient equilibrium credit rationing, as found in my model, and
inefficient rationing.
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Epilogue
My thesis studied contemporary issues in relationship banking and emphasized
the importance of information for the lending business. The first part was
motivated by the tremendous problems that lax and uninformed lending to
households caused in the recent past, as unveiled by the financial crisis of
2007/2008. I argued that household lending can be improved if banks engage
in saving relationships with these households prior to lending since the infor-
mation that can be gathered in saving relationships is of high relevance for the
lending business. Individuals who manage to save on a regular basis should
likely be able to regularly repay debt. Although my work concentrates on
saving relationships, related arguments can be brought forward for transaction
accounts. Information about spending behavior provide insight into households’
capabilities of managing and planing their finances, which should significantly
help to assess their borrower qualities.
The model I developed in Part I showed that savings-linked relationship lending
can improve the efficiency of the financing market and mitigate adverse selection
problems. I found this in particular to be the case for housing finance which
was a major source of problems in the recent past. I identified Bausparen, a
product of housing finance that performed well through the crisis, to contain
the concept of savings-linked relationship lending. Hence, Bausparen shares in
this respect the efficiency that I found for savings-linked relationship lending
in the model.
The current low-interest period has led Bausparkassen—Germany’s special
institutes for Bauspar contracts—into an existential crisis. That, however, does
not show that savings-linked relationship lending has failed. The problems
have rather arisen from other specifics of Bausparen. First, the interest rate
hedging (which was the main focus of the previous literature about Bausparen)
that Bauspar contracts provide have become very costly for old contracts with
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comparably high interest on savings. At the same time the demand for Bauspar
loans has dried-out since fixed credit rates from old contracts have not been
capable of competing with low market rates. Second, the investment universe
of German Bausparkassen is, besides making Bauspar loans, legally limited
to investment-grade securities which have earned hardly any return over the
past years. Third, trying to juridically tackle the aforementioned problems by
canceling expensive Bauspar contracts and by fighting for regulatory easing
have led to a severe reputational damage for Bausparkassen.
All the signs are that Bausparen and Bausparkassen are forced to change
permanently. My work emphasizes that savings-linked relationship lending
is an economically meaningful element in the concept of Bausparen which is
worth preserving in this change. Even more, learning about borrowers in prior
relationships could be executed in a more rigorous way using state-of-the-art
data warehousing and information technology.
Bausparkassen are not exclusively faced with forces to adapt. The whole
banking industry is currently undergoing a tremendous change. Besides policy
issues like extended banking regulation, the change is mainly driven by a
severe damage of trust in traditional banks,53 a new social awareness of the
banking business, changing customer needs, and new technology. These factors
mitigate market entry barriers and thereby allow for increased competition in
the financial services industry. Numerous new players in the banking sector
focus on technology to improve banking services and customer experiences, and
to capture market segments that traditional banks refuse to serve. Technology is
intensively used to establish information-based lending. That is, credit-relevant
information about borrowers is produced and analyzed using new methods and
technologies to obtain improved assessments of borrower qualities.
Extrapolating this trend, credit-relevant information about loan-demanding
53This is due to numerous unveiled cases of opportunistic, excessive, unethical, and even
fraudulent and corrupt behavior of national and international banks.
114
agents will be produced in growing quantity and with increasing sophistication.
Advanced credit reporting systems will collect, connect and process this infor-
mation with increasing pace and reliability. Due to this development, credit
registries can potentially become more and more comprehensive and informative,
which reduces the efficiency-enhancing reputation effects of credit information
sharing that can induce incentives to perform. In times of vast technological and
informational progress, it seems hardly possible to restrict the informativeness
of credit registries to preserve reputation effects, as recommended in the litera-
ture. Contrary to these suggestions, Part II of my thesis provided a different
and probably more viable approach to increase borrower discipline on the basis
of credit information sharing: classical disciplining. I showed that disciplining
can reduce problems of moral hazard and increase borrowers’ incentives to
perform in spite of highly comprehensive and unrestricted credit information
sharing. From my work follows that unconfined credit reporting, a level playing
field, and a high level of transparency are in support of disciplining and also
provoke efficiency of credit information sharing while preventing exploitation.
These properties of credit information sharing also foster ethical responsibility
for which a world of increased information production and storage will call.
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